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Abstract. In this chapter, we review the recent literature on conﬂict and appro-
priation. Allowing for the possibility of conﬂict, which amounts to recognizing the
possibility that property rights are not perfectly and costlessly enforced, represents
a signiﬁcant departure from the traditional paradigm of economics. The research
we emphasize, however, takes an economic perspective. Speciﬁcally, it applies con-
ventional optimization techniques and game-theoretic tools to study the allocation
of resources among competing activities— productive and otherwise appropriative,
such as grabbing the product and wealth of others as well as defending one’s own
product and wealth. In contrast to other economic activities in which inputs are
combined cooperatively through production functions, the inputs to appropriation
are combined adversarially through technologies of conﬂict.
A central objective of this research is to identify the eﬀects of conﬂict on economic
outcomes: the determinants of the distribution of output (or power) and how an
individual party’s share can be inversely related to its marginal productivity; when
settlement in the shadow of conﬂict and when open conﬂict can be expected to
occur, with longer time horizons capable of inducing conﬂict instead of settlement;
how conﬂict and appropriation can reduce the appeal of trade; the determinants of
alliance formation and the importance of intra-alliance commitments; how dynamic
incentives for capital accumulation and innovation are distorted in the presence of
conﬂict; and the role of governance in conﬂict management.
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1 Introduction
Conﬂict is diﬃcult to comprehend from a traditional economic perspective. The diﬃculty
arises from the emphasis that the discipline places on the win-win aspects of exchange and
the gains from trade, at the expense of neglecting environments with imperfectly speciﬁed
and imperfectly enforced property rights. These latter environments are precisely the
ones in which conﬂict typically arises. In this chapter we will review and synthesize recent
research that takes an economic perspective to study conﬂict. This research shares with
traditional economics the assumption of self-interested behavior on the part of economic
agents. However, contrary to traditional economics, there is no presumption that agents
can only produce and trade to make a living. They can also engage in appropriation,
grabbing the production of others or defending what they themselves have produced.
Central to the economic analysis of conﬂict and its consequences, which we emphasize
in this chapter, is the tradeoﬀ between production and appropriation. To the best of our
knowledge, Haavelmo (1954) was the ﬁrst economist to model the basic choice between
production and appropriation, and did so in a general equilibrium setting. Haavelmo was
interested in incorporating appropriation into economic modelling because he thought it
was important for understanding economic development. It seems, however, that other
scholars in economics did not share his vision. For his work in this area, in sharp contrast
to his research in econometrics, has had no discernible impact. Yet, over the past ﬁfteen
years or so, we have witnessed a growing research eﬀort, spearheaded largely by Jack
Hirshleifer and Herschel Grossman, to try to put “conﬂict and appropriation” squarely
within the scope of discourse and inquiry of the economics discipline, and what we cover
in this chapter owes as much to their direct contributions as to their inspiration.
Another important feature of the economic analysis of conﬂict, which we also em-
phasize in this chapter, lies in the modelling of conﬂict as a contest—that is, a game
in which participants expend resources on arming so as to increase their probability of
winning if conﬂict were to actually take place. Actual, overt conﬂict does not necessarily
have to occur but arming can be used, as is often in reality, as a bargaining tool and as
a deterrent within a larger economic context.
We explore the key ingredient of contests, “contest success functions” or ”technologies
of conﬂict” in section 2. These technologies show how probabilities of winning vary with
the diﬀerent levels of arming of those potentially engaged in conﬂict. For the theory
of conﬂict and appropriation they are the analog of production functions in production
theory and utility functions in consumption theory. We discuss the diﬀerent classes of
functional forms that have been used and review their axiomatic foundations or stochastic
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In section 3 we examine two basic models of conﬂict, one that involves ﬁghting for an
exogenous prize and another in which all production is endogenous and contested by the
contending parties. Here we derive some comparative static results of the models in the
equilibrium determination of power, to show how allowing for conﬂict and appropriation
can change many of the standard ﬁndings from traditional economic theory.
In the subsequent sections, we review a number of advances that have been made
recently in this area of research, based largely on variations of one of the two basic
models. Section 4 reviews the various factors, such as the destructive eﬀects of war,
risk aversion and complementarities in production as well as consumption, that could
give adversaries a short-run preference for bargaining and settling instead of ﬁghting.
Because commitments are not possible, open conﬂict can not be ruled out. Hence,
settlement takes place in the shadow of conﬂict. But arming also provides one with a
better bargaining position. We show that the bargaining rules in place and the norms
shared by the parties to potential conﬂict are crucial for the level of arming that emerges
under settlement.
Although there are many reasons to expect adversaries to settle in the short-run, we
often observe open conﬂict and ﬁghting. Typically, conﬂict is considered the outcome
of incomplete and asymmetric information or, even, a result of misperceptions and irra-
tionality. In section 5, we bring attention to another potentially important hypothesis
for the emergence of open conﬂict. In particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that
ﬁghting changes the strategic positions of the adversaries well into the future and in ways
that sequential short-run settlements do not. In this case, a party who views the future
as being important might choose to ﬁght, despite the short-run beneﬁts of settling. Such
a choice would be consistent with rational, forward-looking behavior, based on complete
information. If one or more of the parties views the future as being suﬃciently important,
we would expect the outbreak of war.
Section 6 examines how exchange and trade aﬀect and are aﬀected by insecurity and
conﬂict. When trade across national borders is insecure, but trade within the nation
(or autarky) is not, parties may very well choose autarky, even if doing so limits their
productive opportunities, because the costs of enforcement under trade are too high. But,
in this section we explore, in more detail, the implications of another form of insecurity—
that is, where a contested resource can be traded. Trade and autarky in the presence of
contested resources generally induce diﬀerent levels of arming; and, comparing welfare
under trade and under autarky is far from being straightforward, for the gains from trade
can be outweighed by the additional costs of arming that trade might induce. Thus, the
presence of insecurity and conﬂict can help to explain some types of restrictions on
exchange and market interventions that cannot be explained when property rights areEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 3
perfectly and costlessly enforced.
In section 7, we turn to explore some issues that arise when appropriative activities
are carried out not by unitary actors, but by individuals organized into groups. We
ﬁnd that, relative to the case where individuals compete on their own for the contested
resource, group formation tends to reduce the overall severity of conﬂict, though that
severity varies with diﬀerent group structures. If we were to assume that groups could
somehow commit in advance to a rule to share the prize in case they won, then the
severity of conﬂict would be decreasing in the size of groups, and the grand coalition
(a single group consisting of all individuals) would be the eﬃcient structure. But, here
we suppose instead that conﬂicts over the distribution of the prize within groups cannot
be resolved so easily. Even factoring in this additional source of conﬂict, stable group
formation reduces the severity of conﬂict. Nevertheless, as long as there is some cost
involved in managing within-group conﬂict, the grand coalition will generally not emerge
as the eﬃcient structure. Whether a structure with larger or smaller groups can be
sustained in equilibrium depends crucially on whether groups possess any advantage in
managing conﬂict relative to individuals, and if so to what degree.
Sections 8 and 9 review some dynamic eﬀects of conﬂict and appropriation, and the
role of the state in conﬂict management. Many of the static ineﬃciencies we examine in
the earlier sections become magniﬁed in dynamic settings, with incentives distorted to-
ward appropriative investment and against innovation. The reduction and management
of conﬂict is brieﬂy reviewed in view of recent research on state organization and institu-
tions. Traditional hierarchical governance tends to reduce internal conﬂict but displace
conﬂict at a higher, more organized level between autocratic rulers. Modern governance
may provide more durable solutions to conﬂict, yet research about how it functions
and interacts with economic growth has essentially only just began. We conclude our
overview in section 10.
2 Technologies of conﬂict
A key ingredient of conﬂict has been, and still is, the use of weapons: swords, pikes, can-
nons, bombs, guns, and so on. From an economic perspective, weapons can be thought
of as inputs into conﬂict. However, unlike the case of ordinary economic production, in
which inputs are combined cooperatively in order to produce useful output, the inputs
of conﬂict are contributed by each party in an adversarial fashion against other parties.
Instead of useful production, the output of conﬂict can reasonably be thought to be
wins and losses. How inputs in conﬂict—weapons—translate into wins and losses for the
diﬀerent parties involved in conﬂict is thus the ﬁrst topic that we examine.
Hirshleifer (1989) was ﬁrst to call such functions “technologies of conﬂict,” a termEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 4
which we will be using ourselves throughout this chapter. Consider two contending
parties, labelled i = 1 and i = 2, and denote their choice of weapons as G1 and G2
(for ”guns”). For any given combination of guns, we can expect each party to have a
probability of winning and a probability of losing. (The probability of an impasse or
“draw” is considered to be zero, but we brieﬂy mention the case when this assumption
does not hold below.) Denote the probability of party i = 1 winning as p1(G1,G2) and
the probability of party i = 2 winning as p2(G1,G2).
For pi(G1,G2), i = 1,2, to be probabilities, they need to take on values between 0 and
1 and add up to 1, or equivalently they must satisfy the following: 0 ≤ p2(G1,G2) = 1−
p1(G1,G2) ≤ 1. Moreover, we can expect an increase in one party’s guns to increase her
own winning probability and reduce the winning probability of her opponent; that is,
p1(G1,G2) should be increasing in G1 and decreasing in G2.















where f(·) is a non-negative, increasing function. This class has been employed in a
number of ﬁelds, including in the economics of advertising [Schmalensee (1972)], sports
economics [Szymanski (2003)], rent-seeking [Tullock (1980), Nitzan (1994)], and contests
in general [see Konrad (2005) for a recent survey]. Luce (1959) axiomatizes such proba-
bilistic choice functions in relation to utility theory, while Skaperdas (1996) provides an
axiomatization in relation to contests. Key to both axiomatizations is an Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives property. In the context of conﬂict, this property requires that
the outcome of conﬂict between any two parties depend only on the amount of guns held
by these two parties and not on the amount of guns held by third parties to the conﬂict.
One unique and appealing feature of the class of conﬂict technologies in (1) is that it
naturally extends to the case of conﬂict between more than two parties. Thus, if there
were n parties to the conﬂict, denoting the gun choice of party i by Gi and the vector
















Although we will touch upon the case of more than two parties in section 7, everywhere
else, including in the rest of this section, we will focus on the simple case with n = 2.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 5
The most commonly used functional form is the one in which f(Gi) = Gm
i , where








Sometimes referred to as the “power form” or as the “ratio form,” this functional form
is that which was employed by Tullock (1980) and the ensuing voluminous literature on
rent-seeking. It is also the workhorse functional form used in the economics of conﬂict.
As Hirshleifer (1989) has noted, the probability of winning in this case depends on the
ratio of guns of the two parties, G1
G2. To put it diﬀerently, this technology of conﬂict is
homogeneous of degree zero in guns. For the general case with an arbitrary number
of parties (n), pi(tGi,tG−i) = pi(Gi,G−i) for all t > 0. This property of (3) is rather
convenient analytically, and could account for much of its popularity in applications, like
the Cobb-Douglas form in the case of production functions.
Another well-known functional form is the following “logistic” speciﬁcation, in which
f(Gi) = ekGi, where k > 0, so that,
p1(G1,G2) =
ekG1
ekG1 + ekG2 =
1
1 + ek(G2−G1). (4)
Again as Hirshleifer (1989) has noted and as is evident from the expression above, this
speciﬁcation implies the probability of winning depends on the diﬀerence in guns between
the two parties. Thus, in general, the probabilities are invariant to the addition of a
constant C to the guns of each party—i.e., pi(Gi + C,G−i + C) = pi(Gi,G−i) for all C
such that Gj +C > 0 for all j.1 Though the logistic form also has analytical advantages,
it has not been used as much as the power form shown in (3). The reason is that, for
a number of well-speciﬁed models (including the one we examine in 3.1 below, which is
analogous to the basic rent-seeking model), no pure-strategy, Nash equilibrium exists.
But, an appealing feature of (4), one that accounts for its popularity in econometric
studies of discrete choice, is that it can be derived stochastically.2 In particular, suppose
each party’s “guns” allocation is a noisy predictor of “performance” in battle so that the
performance of party i equals Gi+εi, where εi is a stochastic error term. If the error term
is distributed according to a speciﬁc distribution (namely, the extreme value distribution)
and the outcome of the battle depends on which party performs best (or, more precisely,
p1(G1,G2) = Prob{G1 + ε1 > G2 + ε2}), then (4) is the resultant functional form.
1Hirshleifer (1989) as well as section 4 of Hirshleifer (1995b) and Hirshleifer (2000) provide many
insightful discussions of the technologies of conﬂict and comparisons of the functional forms in (3) and
(4).
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No similar stochastic derivation of the power form in (3) existed, to our knowledge,
until Hirshleifer and Riley (1992). On pp. 380-81 of their book, Hirshleifer and Riley
include an exercise that asks the reader to prove that the power form in the case of n = 2
players, as shown in (3) but with m = 1, can be derived when the performance of party
i is now θiGi, where θi is a multiplicative error term with an exponential distribution—
i.e., Prob{θ1G1 > θ2G2} = G1
G1+G2. Only recently has this result been extended beyond
the case where m = 1 and n = 2. In particular, Jia (2005) derives (3) more generally
for m > 0 and n ≥ 2, assuming that the probability density function for the error, θ
is given by g(θ) = amθ−(m+1) exp(−aθ−m), where a > 0 and θ > 0. Jia shows how
m can be interpreted as a “noise” parameter, with a greater value of m inducing less
noise in the determination of the winner of a contest. That is, higher values for m, and
given a certain level of guns for the parties, make for a closer contest. Therefore, from
the viewpoint of an adversary, it is cheaper in terms of the cost of guns to increase her
probability of winning when m is higher rather than lower. The level of m has been
variously identiﬁed with “decisiveness” or “eﬀectiveness” of conﬂict. In the remainder
of this chapter, we will be using the latter term.
Thus, both the “power” functional form in (3) and the “logistic” form in (4) can
be derived axiomatically as well as stochastically. We should mention that the probit
function—derived under the assumption p1(G1,G2) = Prob{G1 + ε1 > G2 + ε2} with εi
i = 1,2 normally distributed—has not been used in the literature that we review, most
likely because there is no analytical functional form to express it.
The class in (1) and the speciﬁc forms in (3) and (4) have the property of symmetry
or anonymity, in the sense that only the amount of guns possessed by a party and her
adversaries matters for the outcome. Consequently, when two parties hold the same
amount of guns, they have equal probabilities of winning and losing. The cost of pro-
ducing guns might diﬀer across parties, thereby inducing strategic asymmetries between
them and resulting in an asymmetric solution for guns (i.e., G1 6= G2); nevertheless, for
each gun held by the parties, the technology of conﬂict does not favor one party over the
other.
There are circumstances, however, in which one party might be favored over another
though they hold the same amount of guns. An obvious setting conducive to such an
asymmetry is where one party is in a defensive position vis a vis her opponent. The
defender typically, but not always, has the advantage. A simple way to extend (1) to
admit the possibility of such asymmetries is shown in the following form:
p1(G1,G2) =
ϕf(G1)
ϕf(G1) + (1 − ϕ)f(G2).
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where ϕ ∈ (0,1).3 Note that when the parties hold equal amounts of guns, G1 = G2 > 0,
party i = 1’s probability of winning equals ϕ and party i = 2’s probability of winning is
1−ϕ. Thus, when ϕ > 1
2, party i = 1 has an advantage, whereas when ϕ < 1
2 party i = 2
has the advantage, and the closer ϕ is either to 0 or 1, the greater is the advantage that
one party has over another. Clark and Riis (1998) have axiomatized this asymmetric
form for the case of the power function (i.e., where f(G) = Gm), and Grossman and Kim
(1995) have employed that form in order to distinguish between oﬀense and defense.
For the technologies of conﬂict we have reviewed to this point, the sum of the winning
probabilities of all parties involved equals 1. But there are circumstances under which
a draw or an impasse might be a reasonable outcome. That is, a battle could very well
leave the adversaries in the same relative bargaining position as they were before the
battle. Blavatsky (2004) axiomatizes the following reasonable extension of (1) as well as
(5), which captures such a possibility:
p1(G1,G2) =
f1(G1)
1 + f1(G1) + f2(G2)
, (6)
where f1(·) and f2(·) are non-negative increasing functions. According to this general
formulation, the probability of a draw, given by
1 − p1(G1,G2) − p2(G1,G2) =
1
1 + f1(G1) + f2(G2)
,
is always positive. Also note that having f1(·) = ϕf(·) and f2(·) = (1 − ϕ)f(·) yields
a straightforward generalization of the asymmetric form in (5). The “1” that appears
in the denominator of (6) does not have any special signiﬁcance, because if we were to
multiply the numerator and denominator of (6) by any positive number we would get
an equivalent functional form. One way of thinking about (6) is to consider a third
party, say “Nature,” that has a constant endowment of “guns,” G0, which is deﬁned
by f(G0) = 1 (where f(·) is non-negative and increasing). When Nature ”wins”, there
is a draw. Blavatsky (2004) has extended (6) to more than 2 parties but not in the
straightforward way that (2) extends (1).
The technologies of conﬂict we have reviewed in this section have been derived either
axiomatically or stochastically and, thus, are comparable in terms of the foundations to
production functions and utility functions. Yet, unlike the case of production functions,
to our knowledge there have not been empirical estimates of the technologies of conﬂict.
This is a topic, then, that could be taken up in future research.
3It would seem arbitrary to assume, along the lines of the speciﬁcation in (1) that, in this asymmetric
case, pi(G1,G2) =
1
2 for i = 1,2, whenever
P2
i=1 f(Gi) = 0. An alternative and more palatable
speciﬁcation would be p1(G1,G2) = ϕ which would then imply p2(G1,G2) = 1 − p1(G1,G2) = 1 − ϕ.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 8
3 Representative models of conﬂict and the determinants of power
In this section, we present two basic models of conﬂict, both of which embed the conﬂict
technology presented above into an economic framework of optimizing behavior. This
approach to modelling conﬂict eﬀectively envisions the relations between individual par-
ties as anarchic in the sense that, like sovereign states, there is no higher authority to
which they must answer.4 Without a higher authority, contracts between parties can
be meaningful only if those parties can enforce the contracts themselves. But, since the
power of enforcement ultimately derives from the credible threat of using force, under
anarchy individual parties cannot write enforceable contracts that would eliminate arm-
ing and preclude the use of violence. As these implications indicate, the approach of
this research departs sharply from a long tradition in neoclassical economics that largely
ignores any imperfections in contracts and views property rights as perfectly and cost-
lessly enforced. However, the approach is much in line with the fundamental assumption
of self-interest, for a genuine Homo economicus would not refrain from using force, if by
doing so, he could enhance her material well-being.
Laws, institutions and norms would be expected to emerge to limit and shape the use
of force by economic agents, as they pursue their self interests.5 Nevertheless, under an-
archy, an individual’s holding of guns would seem paramount in determining her position
relative to others and thus in inﬂuencing the terms of transactions. Of course, this in-
ﬂuence comes at a cost, for the production of guns necessarily diverts valuable resources
from other uses and the use of guns can have other more direct negative consequences
on welfare.
The model we present in the ﬁrst subsection abstracts from individual parties’ pro-
duction decisions, and hence might be considered a partial equilibrium framework. Nev-
ertheless, it is closely related to the basic rent-seeking model—see, e.g., Nitzan (1994)—
and its simplicity allows us to highlight the logic of the interactions between individuals
as they contest a given resource. In the subsequent subsection, we present an extended
model where the contested pie is endogenous to the decisions that the adversaries make
between production and appropriation. This extension shifts the focus of the analysis
more squarely on the trade-oﬀ between guns and butter, allowing us to make the op-
portunity cost of guns explicit. Overall, our central objective here is to highlight the
implications of abandoning the assumption of neoclassical economic theory that property
is secure for (i) the equilibrium determination of income and (ii) the distribution of that
income or equivalently, in this model the determination of power.
4While this research has important implications for the interactions between nations, such interactions
are not our primary focus or concern.
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3.1 Competing for a resource
Consider an environment populated by two identical, risk-neutral agents. These agents
can be thought of as either individuals or collections thereof—for example, tribes or
nations. However, we abstract from all problems of collective action and put aside, for
now, any issues that may arise with group formation.6 Here, we treat each agent as a
unitary actor, and suppose that they contest R ≡ 2R units of a resource, which can
be consumed directly. Each agent might claim the rights to half or even more of the
resource. However, due to imperfect institutions of governance and enforcement, any
such claim can be settled only by overt conﬂict or, equivalently, in this setting under
the threat of conﬂict, through the production of “guns” or “arms” (Gi). In particular,
following the approach outlined in section 2, we model the conﬂict over R as a winner-
take-all contest: pi(G1,G2) denotes the probability that agent i emerges as the winner
and thus is able to claim the entire resource (R) as her prize, leaving nothing for her
opponent j 6= i for i = 1,2. To ﬁx ideas, assume that pi(G1,G2) is symmetric, taking
the functional form shown in (3).
Consistent with the general class of conﬂict technologies discussed in section 2, this
speciﬁcation implies that agent i’s likelihood of winning the resource R, pi(G1,G2), is
increasing in her choice of guns, Gi, and decreasing in that of her opponent j 6= i, Gj, for
i = 1,2. Thus, each agent’s expected gross winnings, pi(G1,G2)R, is similarly increasing
in her own production of guns, Gi and decreasing in that of her opponent, Gj j 6= i for
i = 1,2. However, the production of guns is not costless. In particular, as noted above,
producing guns diverts the ﬂow of valuable resources from useful, welfare enhancing
activities.7 This cost of producing guns is borne by the agent whether or not she wins
the contest. Thus, agent i’s expected payoﬀ, Vi(G1,G2), can be written as follows:
Vi(G1,G2) = pi(G1,G2)R − Gi i = 1,2, (7)
where pi(G1,G2) is given by (3). Note that under the alternative, non-probabilistic
interpretation of (3), where agents are envisioned as dividing the contested resource
according to their respective winning probabilities pi(G1,G2) given their choices of guns,
the expected payoﬀ shown above would be equivalent to the agent’s ex post payoﬀ.
Note further that this interpretation is equivalent to our probabilistic interpretation
of (3) as a winner-take-all contest. This equivalence, which arises under various sets of
assumptions (including the assumption of risk neutrality speciﬁed here), implies, in turn,
that the agents are indiﬀerent, in an ex ante sense, between the two contests as a way
6We take up these issues in section 7, where we consider the possibility of coalition formation explicitly.
7In a more fully articulated setting such as in the model presented in the following section, this
opportunity cost could be modelled more explicitly as a reduction in the production of goods available
for current consumption and/or for future consumption.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 10
of distributing the resource, R. However, the actual outcomes and the corresponding
payoﬀs obtained under each could be very diﬀerent.8
Subject to the conﬂict technology (3) and treating her opponent’s choice of guns
as given, each agent i chooses Gi to maximize her expected payoﬀ (7). The conﬂict
technology implies generally that, if agent i’s opponent were to make no appropriative
eﬀort (Gj = 0, j 6= i), agent i could seize all of R with near certainty by producing an
inﬁnitesimally small quantity of guns. But, neither agent would leave such an oppor-
tunity unexploited. As such, the “peaceful” outcome where Gi = 0 for i = 1,2 cannot







R − 1 = 0 i = 1,2. (8)
The ﬁrst term on the left hand side (RHS) of the condition represents the marginal
beneﬁt of guns. By producing an additional gun, holding everything else constant, agent
i enhances her chances of winning the prize (R) or equivalently her power. From (3), it









2 )2, j 6= i, i = 1,2. (9)
The second term on the RHS of (8) represents the marginal cost of guns, a constant and
equal to 1 for both players.9
Under our speciﬁcations for the players’ expected payoﬀs (7) and the conﬂict tech-
nology (3), the ﬁrst-order conditions shown in (8) combined with (9) for i = 1,2 deﬁne
a unique, symmetric pure-strategy (Nash) equilibrium:
G∗
i = G∗ = m
2 R i = 1,2, (10)
implying that each party i has an equal chance of winning R: p∗
i = p∗ = 1
2 for i = 1,2.10
Thus each player’s expected winnings equals p∗R = R, where R = 1
2R measures the
contested resource in per capita terms, as previously deﬁned. But, the players’ expected
payoﬀs are also negatively aﬀected by the guns they produce. To be more precise, by
8Moreover, as discussed in some detail below, the ex ante equivalence breaks down under reasonable
conditions, implying a preference for negotiated settlement under the shadow of conﬂict [see section 4].
9It might be more reasonable to suppose that the marginal cost is increasing due to diminishing
returns. Although assuming a constant marginal cost of appropriative activity is not critical here, it
could matter where, as discussed below, we admit the possibility of group formation. Also see Esteban
and Ray (2001).
10See Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) for conditions and proofs under more general speciﬁcations for
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substituting the solution G∗ into (7) with R replaced by 2R, one can verify that the
payoﬀ expected by agent i, Vi(G∗), in this symmetric equilibrium is given by





R, i = 1,2. (11)
Since, by assumption, m ∈ (0,1], this expression shows that each player has an incentive
to participate in the contest, even factoring in the cost of producing guns.
One result that follows immediately from these solutions is that a larger “prize,” R
in per capita terms, induces greater allocations to guns and hence induces more conﬂict.
But, the increased cost of conﬂict is swamped by an accompanying increase in each
side’s gross expected winnings. That is, the net eﬀect of an increase in R on each agent’s
expected payoﬀ is positive, dV
dR
∗
= 1 − m
2 > 0. The solutions show further that the
conﬂict eﬀectiveness parameter, m, has a positive inﬂuence on the players’ optimizing
guns choice, G∗, and thus a negative inﬂuence on the payoﬀ each agent expects to obtain
in the symmetric equilibrium, V (G∗). The spill-over eﬀects of the contenders’ choices give
rise to the possibility that some coordination of choices could make them both better oﬀ.
In particular, if the two players could enter into a credible agreement to share R equally
with no the threat of conﬂict (i.e., without guns, G∗ = 0), then the payoﬀ to each would
be, V (0) = 1
2R = R, implying a gain of V (0)−V (G∗) = m
2 R, which is precisely the cost
of conﬂict borne by each agent. However, the potential here for mutually beneﬁcial gains
is not itself suﬃcient to induce a better outcome. The critical departure of this research
from the long-standing neoclassical approach that rules out the possibility of contracting
by agents to eliminate conﬂict and arming, at the same time, raises important questions
about the feasibility of realizing such gains. Below we return to this issue, exploring
alternative ways in which agents could possibly limit arming under anarchy.
3.2 Guns versus butter
A fundamental premise of the economics literature on conﬂict is that economic agents
often face a tradeoﬀ between producing goods and grabbing what others have produced.
Indeed, the tradeoﬀ between production and appropriation is central to the study of
interaction between individual parties under anarchy. In this section we extend the
model developed above, incorporating production as well as appropriation to study this
tradeoﬀ more formally.11 This extension enables us to make explicit the opportunity
11An early form of this model was ﬁrst presented in Hirshleifer (1988) and can be found in his subse-
quent publications, including Hirshleifer (1989, 1991, 1995a). However, the very ﬁrst general equilibrium
model of this sort appeared in the often neglected work of Haavelmo (1954, pp.91-98). Other contributors
to the more recent literature include Garﬁnkel (1990), Grossman (1991), Skaperdas (1992), Grossman and
Kim (1996), Esteban and Ray (1999), Wittman (2000), and Mehlum et al. (2003). Also see Skaperdas
(2003) for a detailed review of the literature.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 12
cost of guns and to highlight its role in the determination of the distribution of power
between the two agents.
In this model of conﬂict, each agent i, i = 1,2, possesses Ri units of a secure primary
resource. This resource, which can be thought of as a composite of labor and land, cannot
be consumed directly. Instead, it is allocated among two sorts of activities: (i) usefully
productive activities that eventually yield goods for consumption (i.e., butter) and (ii)
appropriative activities that ultimately determine the distribution of those consumption
goods among them. To be more precise, each agent i transforms her initial resource (Ri)
into guns (Gi) on a one-to-one basis and into an intermediate input (Xi) at a rate of
βi-to-one, as follows:
Ri = Gi + Xi/βi, i = 1,2. (12)
As will become obvious below, βi measures agent i’s marginal product in the production
of butter. Rearranging (12) shows that her production of Xi depends positively on her
initial resource, Ri, net of what she allocates to appropriation, Gi, as well as positively
on the productivity parameter, βi:
Xi = βi[Ri − Gi], i = 1,2. (13)
To ﬁx ideas, we suppose henceforth that β1 ≥ β2. Thus, agent i = 1 (i = 2) is the more
(less) productive contender.
Given these allocations, the two sides, i = 1 and 2, combine their intermediate
inputs, Xi, in a joint production process that delivers ¯ B units of butter for consumption,
according to the following speciﬁcation:
¯ B ≡ F(X1,X2) =
2 X
i=1
βi[Ri − Gi]. (14)
As we have speciﬁed the units and the technology of transformation of the initial resource
in (12), the quantity of the intermediate good, Xi, that agent i contributes to the joint
production of butter, i = 1,2, coincides with the compensation that the agent would
receive in a competitive world if property rights were well-deﬁned and perfectly enforced.
This hypothetical compensation is increasing in the agent’s own marginal product, βi,
as well as that part of her initial resource she chooses to devote to usefully productive
activities, Xi = Ri − Gi.12 [In what follows where there is no risk of confusion, we will
12One could assume a more general speciﬁcation for the joint production technology, F(X1,X2), which
is similarly linearly homogeneous and increasing, but is also strictly concave in each input and, exhibits
some degree of complementarity between them: Fi > 0, Fii < 0, and Fij > 0 for j 6= i i = 1,2, where
subscripts represent partial derivatives. Skaperdas (1992), Neary (1997), and Skaperdas and SyropoulosEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 13
write F(X1,X2) as F(G) to emphasize the dependence of this function on the agents’
gun choices as represented by the vector, G, while economizing on notation.]
However, in the anarchic environment we are studying here, the output from the
two agents’ joint production, ¯ B ≡ F(G), is subject to dispute, which we suppose is
resolved in a winner-take-all contest, with each agent’s probability of winning depending
on her relative holdings of guns. This method of distributing the yield from their joint
eﬀorts in production motivates the agents to devote some of their initial resource to
guns production, thereby making the tradeoﬀ between appropriation (G) and useful
production (X) embedded in (12) relevant. Speciﬁcally, subject to the conﬂict technology
(3) and her production technology (13), each agent i chooses Gi, taking the other agent’s
guns choice (Gj) as given, to maximize her expected payoﬀ, which equals the prize that
goes to the sole winner—i.e., the aggregate quantity of butter they produce jointly—
weighted by the probability that she wins the conﬂict. Using the speciﬁcation for total




βk[Ri − Gj] i = 1,2, (15)
where pi(G1,G2) is given by (3).13
Although the conﬂict technology (3) implies, as before, that peace (i.e, G1+G2 = 0)
cannot be a Nash equilibrium outcome, variation in βi and Ri across agents i = 1 and
2 means generally that we cannot rule out the possibility that one of the two agents
will exhaust all of her initial resource in the production of guns, Gi = Ri, implying that
Xi = 0, for i = 1 or 2.14 However, to remain focussed on the central issues of concern, we
(1997) provide such more general treatments of the model presented in this subsection. Here, since the
speciﬁcation for total output shown in (14) assumes that production is separable in the two inputs, X1
and X2, that representation could be viewed simply as total production which depends on two separate
and independent technologies, one for each agent.
13Given our assumptions that (i) the players are risk neutral and (ii) the total quantity of production
is linearly homogeneous and separable in the two factors, Xi, our interpretation of conﬂict as a winner-
take-all contest is again equivalent to the non-probabilistic interpretation, which views the winning
probabilities as consumption shares. Under the non-probabilistic interpretation, given our separable
speciﬁcation for aggregate production (14), one can think of agent i’s consumption share, pi(G1,G2), as
representing the fraction of her own product, Xi, that she successfully defends and the fraction of other
agent’s product, Xj, that she conﬁscates with her choice of Gi, given Gj j 6= i. [see footnote 12]. For an
analysis that distinguishes between defense and oﬀense in appropriation, see Grossman and Kim (1995)
14To be sure, given our speciﬁcations for the payoﬀ functions (15) and production (14), that a unique,
pure-strategy equilibrium exists follows from our speciﬁcation for the conﬂict technology (3). In particu-
lar, existence requires pi[∂2pi/∂G2
i] < (∂pi/∂Gi)2, and uniqueness of that equilibrium follows from the
general characteristics of (1) satisﬁed by our speciﬁcation in (3). See Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997).Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 14








βj[Rj − Gj] − βipi(G1,G2) = 0, i = 1,2. (16)
The ﬁrst term on the LHS of the condition represents the marginal beneﬁt of guns
production, reﬂecting an increase in the likelihood of winning the contest when agent i
produces an additional gun, which is shown in (9). As in the previous model, for both
agents, the marginal eﬀect of an increase in their production of guns is multiplied by
the contested good to give an expression for the marginal beneﬁt of guns to agent i as a
function of the gun choices by both agents. However, in this model, what the agents are
contesting—i.e., ¯ B = F(G)—is itself endogenous. The second term on the LHS of the
condition represents the marginal cost to the agent of producing that additional gun—
that is, the resulting reduction in butter output—weighted by the probability she will
win the contest, as only in that case will she realize that (smaller) prize. The marginal
cost to each agent i depends positively on her marginal product in the production of Xi,
βi. At an interior optimum, each agent i balances her marginal cost against her marginal
beneﬁt, such that the conditions in (16) implicitly deﬁne the equilibrium solutions for
guns production, G∗
i ∈ (0,Ri), for i = 1,2.
3.2.1 Symmetric outcomes
In the special case where the agents are identical—i.e., βi = β = 1 and Ri = R for
i = 1,2,—these conditions imply a unique, pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium in
which Gi = G∗ < R, and consequently each agent has an equal chance of winning the
conﬂict: p∗ = 1
2 for i = 1,2. To be more precise, using (3) with (16), it is straightforward
to verify that
G∗
i = G∗ = m
m+1R, i = 1,2, (17)
which is increasing in the conﬂict eﬀectiveness parameter (m) as well as in the initial
resource (R). In turn, from equation (14), we can ﬁnd that the agents jointly pro-
duce ¯ B = F(G∗) = 1
m+12R units of butter. Then, equation (15) implies that, in this
symmetric equilibrium, each agent i obtains an expected payoﬀ, Vi(G∗), equal to
Vi(G∗) = V ∗ = 1
m+1R, i = 1,2, (18)
which is decreasing in the conﬂict eﬀectiveness parameter, m, but increasing in the initial
resource each agent receives, R. These are precisely the implications of the simpler model
of section 3.1.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 15
Even when we relax the symmetry assumption, and suppose instead that R1 6= R2,
but maintain the assumption that the two agents are equally productive, β1 = β2 = 1, a
symmetric equilibrium obtains. That is, letting e R ≡ 1
2[R1 + R2] denote the mean value
of the two players’ initial resource and assuming an interior optimum,15 the conditions
in (16) imply the following solutions for guns:
G∗
i = G∗ = m
m+1 e R, i = 1,2. (19)
In this case, since the parties make identical guns allocations (G∗
1 = G∗
2) despite the
diﬀerence in their initial endowments, the agent’s expected payoﬀs, given by
Vi(G∗) = V ∗ = 1
m+1 e R, i = 1,2, (20)
are identical, implying that insecurity neutralizes the eﬀects of cross-sectional variation
in the resource endowment on individual payoﬀs. Jack Hirshleifer (1991) attributes this
tendency, which he coins the paradox of power, to the relatively poorer side viewing the
marginal return from appropriation to be relatively higher than the marginal product
from useful production.16 Hence, the poorer side tends to devote a relatively greater share
of her initial resource to appropriation. This result, however, does not necessarily extend
to the more general speciﬁcation for production, F(X1,X2), which is similarly linearly
homogeneous and increasing, but is also strictly concave in each input [see Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (1997)].
3.2.2 Asymmetric outcomes
Now suppose that the agents diﬀer with respect to both their initial resources, Ri, and
their marginal products βi. Suppose, in particular, to ﬁx ideas that β1 > β2 such that
agent 1 has a comparative advantage in useful production. Assume further that a fully
interior optimum exists.17 Then taking the ratio of agent i = 1’s ﬁrst-order condition to








15The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an interior optimum, where neither player exhausts her
entire resource on guns production, is the following: if Ri > Rj, then Rj >
m
2+1Ri. This condition
requires that the diﬀerence between the players’ initial resource not be too large.
16Hirshleifer refers to the case where power (or consumption shares) is equalized across the players
having diﬀerent initial resources as the strong form of the paradox. He also takes note of a weak form in
which the disparity in consumption shares is narrower than that in the initial endowments.
17As illustrated in the previous example, an interior optimum where Xi > 0 holds for i = 1,2
requires that any asymmetries present across agents i are relatively mild. In particular, assuming
that Ri > Rj, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the solutions shown in (23) to hold is that
[1 + (m + 1)(βi/βj)
m
m+1]βjRj > mβiRi.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 16
or that G∗
2 > G∗
1 if and only if β1 > β2. That is to say, the agent who is less eﬀective in
useful production will be the more powerful agent, in the sense that she has the greater





















Further manipulation of the ﬁrst-order conditions, (16) for i = 1,2, gives us the following
















These solutions with the production speciﬁcation in (14) imply further that the agents’
joint production of butter equals F(G∗) = 1
m+1[β1R1+β2R2]. Then, one can easily verify
that the payoﬀ expected by agent i in equilibrium, which can be written as Vi(G∗) =
p∗
iF(G∗) i = 1,2, with p∗
i equal to the appropriate solution shown in (22), is higher for the
less productive player, i = 2, simply because p∗
2 > p∗
1. It is important to note here that,
with more general speciﬁcations for the production of butter than that assumed here (14),
the inequality β1 > β2 need not indicate that agent i = 1 is relatively more productive.
Nonetheless, where property is insecure, whoever is relatively more productive will have
a smaller chance of enjoying the output she produced with her opponent.18
This result might seem surprising at ﬁrst. After all, it stands in sharp contrast to the
prediction of neoclassical economic theory, based on the assumption of well-deﬁned and
perfectly and costlessly enforced property rights, that agents are compensated according
to their relative marginal productivities. However, the result here is entirely consistent
with economic theory. Speciﬁcally, it is based on self-interest, as each agent exploits her
own comparative advantage. Moreover, although the result has been shown within the
context of a simple model, it is quite robust. In particular, it holds for a general class
of symmetric conﬂict technologies, with a more general speciﬁcation for the production
technology than that assumed here.19
Equation (21) reveals another striking result of this model, similar to the paradox of
power mentioned above. That is, provided the resource constraint in guns production,
Ri − Gi ≥ 0 or Xi ≥ 0, is not binding,20 the equilibrium distribution of power depends
18For a detailed discussion and analysis which is related to the elasticity of substitu-
tion/complementarity between the agents’ inputs, see Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997).
19See Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997). The implications of this result in a dynamic context for
incentives to innovate are discussed below in section 8.
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only on the relative value of the players’ marginal products βi and the conﬂict eﬀective-
ness parameter m. The distribution of the initial resource Ri across the agents i = 1,2
plays no role. This ﬁnding can be attributed to the combination of two assumptions: (i)
the risk neutrality of economic agents; and (ii) the absence of complementarity in pro-
duction (between input factors) or consumption (between diﬀerent types of consumption
goods). If either of these two assumptions were relaxed, asymmetries in the resource
endowment would drive a wedge between the adversaries’ guns choices and thus matter
for the determination of power. An agent’s probability of winning, in this case, would
be positively related to the size of her endowment relative to that of her opponent.21
The inverse relationship between productivity and power helps us understand an
empirical regularity for much of human history: those who enjoyed the highest material
rewards also were, or had power over, specialists in violence. Kings, lords, knights,
and warriors owed their material standard of living on the coercive power rather than
their economic productivity. As Milgrom (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (2000) argue, a
similar tendency may well exist within modern organizations in the absence of suﬃcient
restraints on inﬂuence activities in such organizations.
Finally, the conﬂict eﬀectiveness parameter, m, has the same qualitative inﬂuence
in this setting as in the simpler model of the previous section. Speciﬁcally, a larger m
implies a greater incentive to arm by all agents, and consequently less production of
butter and material welfare.
4 Settlement in the shadow of conﬂict
In our presentation to this point, we have not distinguished between conﬂicts with prob-
abilistic outcomes, in which each contending party has a probability of winning, and
conﬂicts with deterministic outcomes, in which each party receives a share of what is un-
der dispute. The equivalence of the probabilistic and deterministic interpretations of the
representative models can be derived under the assumption of risk neutrality. However,
risk neutrality is neither suﬃcient nor necessary. In practice, interactions under anarchy
typically involve a great degree of accommodation by the interacting parties with open
conﬂict (or warfare) being only a last resort, and the outcomes under conﬂict and under
settlement are rather diﬀerent.
To illustrate what sorts of conditions might be more conducive to settlement, where
negotiations by the individual parties would be more likely to result in a division of
the contested good (a “cold” war) instead of open conﬂict (a “hot” war), we envision
21Diﬀerences in resource endowments would matter in this case, regardless of whether the players are
equally productive (β1 = β2 = 1) or not. See Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), who provide results in
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the interactions between the players as a two-stage game with the following protocol of
moves:
Stage 1 Parties independently and simultaneously make their guns choices.
Stage 2 Given those choices, they enter into negotiations about how to divide the con-
tested good.
2-1 If they agree on a division, they share the good accordingly.
2-2 If they reach an impasse, their negotiations end in conﬂict, with the winner
taking the entire prize, leaving nothing for the other party.
The decision of whether to ﬁght is made in stage 2. Obviously, both parties would have
to agree on a particular division for settlement to emerge as the equilibrium outcome,
but only one party has to decide to ﬁght for open conﬂict to emerge as the outcome.
There are a number of compelling reasons for both parties to prefer a settlement in stage
2, and we discuss brieﬂy some major ones below ﬁrst. Then we characterize outcomes
under settlement under various rules of division.
4.1 Sources of the preference for settlement
4.1.1 Destruction and additional costs of open conﬂict
Contrary to our implicit assumption in the models of the previous section, open conﬂict
typically destroys output and resources, and requires the use of arms beyond those that
would be necessary for the parties to negotiate a settlement. Under the reasonable
assumption that ﬁghting yields no other beneﬁts, a negotiated settlement should be
feasible—that is, provided, the parties have open channels of communication.
To illustrate, we return to the benchmark model of section 3.2, where any particular
choice of guns that might have been made in stage 1, say G0
i i = 1,2, would, by
the technology constraint in (14), result in the following production of butter, F(G) =
P2
i=1 βi[Ri − G0
i]. We suppose that, in this setting, if ﬁghting were to occur, only a
fraction, φ < 1, of total butter output, F(G), would be left for the winner with the
remaining fraction, 1−φ, destroyed in combat. Under settlement, by contrast, this output
is divided in accordance with the winning probabilities. Then, given the technology of
conﬂict (1), the expected payoﬀ in the event of open conﬂict would be pi(G0
1,G0
2)φF(G),
for i = 1,2. Under settlement where the losses from ﬁghting are avoided, the agents’
payoﬀs are pi(G0
1,G0
2)F(G) for i = 1,2. Provided that φ < 1, both sides would have
an incentive to agree on the division of the total pie in accordance with the winning
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players are risk neutral, suggesting that knowing their attitudes towards risk alone is not
suﬃcient to determine their preference(s) for settlement relative to open conﬂict.
There would be, of course, many other ways to divide the pie, but the possibilities are
limited by each player’s option to shut down negotiations and ﬁght instead. That is to
say, each agent’s expected payoﬀ under open conﬂict, which depends on their holdings of
guns chosen in advance, deﬁnes the minimum payoﬀ the agent would be willing to accept
under any division rule. At the same time, the agents’ holdings of guns serve to enforce
any settlement they reach. Hence, the feasibility of these agreements is not predicated on
third-party enforcement, and thus could be supported under anarchy. As discussed below
in the context of our model with both appropriation and production where the agents
are identical, at least one rule of division among the set of rules that could be supported
under anarchy (i.e., those rules that both agents ﬁnd acceptable) strictly dominates the
rule of division we have considered which is based on winning probabilities alone. Thus,
here we have shown the possibility of a preference for settlement under conditions that
are not most favorable to such a preference.
4.1.2 Risk aversion and the uncertainty of conﬂict
The outcome of open conﬂict is typically subject to much uncertainty. While we have
captured this uncertainty in our models, we have, at the same time, maintained that
the contending parties are risk-neutral—that they do not care about the risk entailed
in the outcome of open conﬂict. But, the fact of the matter is that most people are
risk averse, particularly when it comes to large uncertain events—such as wars—having
much potential to aﬀect their their jobs, career paths, health, and more generally their
lives. If possible, they would avoid risks, but if it is not possible to avoid these risks,
individuals would try to insure against them. We would expect such attitudes toward
risk to transfer to political and military leaders and to the risk preferences expressed at
the country level. Because war is uncertain but a particular settlement is not, a range
of negotiated settlements can be expected to be preferable by both parties.
This logic can be shown within our benchmark model of section 3.2. Again consider
any particular choice of guns that might have been made in stage 1, say G0
i i = 1,2.
Then the production speciﬁcation in (14) implies the following total output of butter,
F(G) =
P2
i=1 βi[Ri − G0
i]. To isolate the importance of risk aversion alone, we assume
no destruction from ﬁghting: φ = 1. Strictly concave von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions—i.e., , U(·) with UB > 0 and UBB < 0, where subscripts denote partial
derivatives—reﬂect the agents’ aversion to risk. Then, in the event of conﬂict, agent
i’s expected payoﬀ would be pi(G0
1,G0
2)U[F(G)] + [1 − pi(G0
1,G0
2)]U[0]. By contrast,
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probability or pi(G0
1,G0




2)F(G), her payoﬀ would
be U[pi(G0
1,G0
2)F(G)]. By the strict concavity of U(·), the payoﬀ under settlement is
strictly greater than the expected payoﬀ under war for any given set of choices for guns,
G0
1 and G0
2. Thus, risk aversion could motivate both sides to agree to a division of the
pie according to their winning probabilities whereby they could avoid ﬁghting.22
It would be quite reasonable to argue that, in practice, there are multiple sources
of uncertainty, whereas we assume only one—who will win and who will lose—with the
probabilities pi(G0
1,G0
2) i = 1,2 known by both sides. Do our results, then, understate
the agents’ preference for settlement? It is true that assuming only one source of uncer-
tainty imparts quite a bit of knowledge on both parties. It is not immediately obvious,
however, that admitting additional sources of uncertainty (e.g., diﬀerent expectations,
unforeseen contingencies, and so on), would make risk averse players even more conser-
vative and more willing to negotiate. To the best of our knowledge, no one has formally
examined the eﬀects of risk aversion in such complicated environments. And, there is
a well-known ﬁnding related to the issue in hand that, in the presence of incomplete
information, where each side has a diﬀerent set of beliefs about the nature of their inter-
action, the contending sides are more likely to choose open conﬂict in equilibrium [see,
e.g., Brito and Intriligator (1985) and Bester and W¨ arneryd (2006)].23
4.1.3 Complementarities in production and consumption
Another consequence of open conﬂict having winners and losers is that the distribution
of what is being contested among the parties could easily be far from what would be
optimal for production or consumption. Consider, for example, the situation where two
agents contest some territory. In the case of war, the winner could get all the contested
land minus its people who might become refugees on the loser’s remaining territory.
In this case, the winner would likely have too much land relative to its available labor
force, whereas the losing country would have insuﬃcient land relative to its available
labor force. In a negotiated settlement, the two countries could avoid this imbalance,
thereby making both sides better oﬀ than they would be in expected terms under war.
Likewise, there are complementarities between ﬁnal consumption goods and a similar
line of reasoning that shows a preference for negotiated settlements applies.
To make this reasoning more explicit, we must consider a slightly diﬀerent model of
conﬂict. One possibility, which follows our discussion above, involves several modiﬁca-
22Again, for reasons made explicit below, dividing the pie according to the agents’ winning probabilities
need not be the best rule, such that the preference for settlement could be stronger than what these
calculations would indicate.
23Risk aversion can also have distributional eﬀects similar to those examined in the previous section.
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tions to the benchmark model presented in section 3.2. In the modiﬁed model, the two
agents, i = 1,2, do not contest their output. Instead, as in the model presented in section
3.1, they contest a productive resource, which we denote here by T for territory or land.
Let Ti denote country i’s holding of land, which would be realized with the outcome of
stage 2 of the negotiation process, whether it be under open conﬂict in a winner-take-all
contest or under settlement by a division in accordance with the winning probabilities.
At the same time, like the model of section 3.2, this modiﬁed model supposes that each
agent is endowed with a secure resource, b Ri units of human capital, which she allocates
to appropriative activities (Gi) and productive activities (Li), subject to the constraint,
b Ri = Gi + Li/βi.24 Each agent i produces butter, Bi, with her inputs Ti and Li, ac-
cording to the following technology: Bi = F(Ti,Li) i = 1,2, which is increasing and
strictly concave in Ti and Li (given Gi) and exhibits some degree of complementarity
between its input factors, FTiLi > 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Now
suppose again that in stage 1, each agent chooses a certain quantity of guns, G0
i, leaving
L0
i = βi[b Ri − G0
i] units of labor for the production of butter. Then, under open conﬂict,
agent i’s expected payoﬀ would be pi(G0
1,G0
2)F[T,L0




der a negotiated settlement with each party receiving a share of the contested resource
equal to her winning probability Ti = pi(G0
1,G0
2)T, the payoﬀ obtained by each agent i
would be Bi = F[pi(G0
1,G0
2)T,L0
i]. While each agent is assumed to be risk neutral, the
strict concavity of F(·,Li) in land makes the players’ payoﬀs under settlement strictly
greater than their respective expected payoﬀs under war for any given choice of guns, G0
i
i = 1,2.
4.2 How much arming? Settlement under diﬀerent rules of division
Based on a number of alternative two-stage models of conﬂict—largely, variations of the
benchmark model presented in section 3.2—with the protocol of moves speciﬁed above,
we have shown there exists a range of diﬀerent scenarios that render settlement preferable
to open conﬂict. Settlement would then be a part of any perfect equilibrium of games
with the protocol of moves that we speciﬁed above. However, we have not even touched
upon the implications of settlement for arming. Recall that, in this anarchic setting, the
individual parties can make no ﬁrm commitments regarding their guns choices. Does
the expectation of reaching a negotiated settlement in the future reduce the parties’
24It is important to distinguish not only between secure and insecure resource endowments, but given
our interest here in complements in production, also between diﬀerent types of factor inputs. Hence,
whereas we view the secure resource, R, in the model of section 3.2 as a composite of labor, land,
capital and other inputs, we must view the secure resource b R of this modiﬁed framework more narrowly
to exclude land, the insecure resource. That all land is insecure in this modiﬁed framework is not
important for our purposes. But, if we were to relax this assumption, the quantity of agent i’s secure
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choices relative to the case where they anticipate war? Furthermore, among the many
possible negotiated settlements and rules of division that would be acceptable to both
sides, which ones would the two sides be expected to use? Are there any rules of division
that are “better” than others and, if so, in what sense? While we cannot answer all
of these questions, in this subsection we illustrate how diﬀerent rules of division aﬀect
arming and material welfare. In particular, we demonstrate the sensitivity of arming
and welfare to the rule of division.
To proceed, we return to the benchmark model of section 3.2, with one modiﬁcation
only, that open conﬂict is destructive.25 Speciﬁcally, suppose that a fraction 1 − φ
of butter would be lost if ﬁghting broke out. Assume further, for convenience, that
both agents are identical with respect to their productivities: β1 = β2 = 1. We continue,
however, to allow for diﬀerences in their initial resource: R1 and R2, with e R ≡ 1
2[R1+R2]
indicating the mean value. If open conﬂict were to break out in the second stage, the two
parties’ guns choices, indicated by the vector G, and the resulting production of butter,
¯ B = F(G), as dictated by (12) and (14) when βi = 1 imply that the expected payoﬀ for
agent i = 1,2 would be given by the total quantity of butter not destroyed in combat
weighted by the probability of winning, pi(G1,G2), as speciﬁed in (3):
V w
i = pi(G1,G2)φ[2e R − G1 − G2], (24)
for i = 1,2.
Under settlement, the two sides agree to divide their joint product, ¯ B = F(G),
according to some rule, which will depend at least in part on their guns choices. For
now, suppose that, by this rule, the share of total butter agent i receives is δi(G1,G2),
implying the following payoﬀ under settlement:
V s
i = δi(G1,G2)[2e R − G1 − G2], (25)
for i = 1,2.
4.2.1 Equilibrium under open conﬂict
For future comparisons, consider the outcome if both agents expect their negotiations
to breakdown, resulting in open conﬂict in stage 2. With this expectation, each agent i
would choose Gi in stage 1 to maximize her expected payoﬀ, V w
i , subject to the conﬂict
25As suggested by our discussion above, either risk aversion or complementarity in production or
consumption would similarly create a short-term incentive for the parties to settle. Assuming that
open conﬂict has a destructive element, however, makes the calculus much easier. For a comparison of
alternative rules of division in the case of complementarities, see Anbarci et al. (2002).Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 23
technology (3), taking the other side’s choice as given. The ﬁrst-order conditions from







φ[2e R − G1 − G2] − φpi(G1,G2) = 0, i = 1,2.
Observe that φ > 0 can be factored out from both the ﬁrst term—the marginal beneﬁt
of guns—and the second term—the marginal cost of guns—on the LHS of each agent’s
condition. Thus, the conditions above for i = 1,2 simplify to those from the model of
section 3.2 (16), with β1 = β2 = 1. As can be easily conﬁrmed using the conditions
above with (3) and (9), the optimizing solutions, Gw
i , are given by
Gw
i = Gw = m
m+1 e R, i = 1,2, (26)
and are identical to those where war was assumed not to be destructive (19).26 These
solutions, in turn, imply an equal distribution of power: pw = 1
2 for i = 1,2. Then
combining equations (26) and (14) shows that the quantity of butter available for con-
sumption, after factoring in the destruction of warfare, would be φF(Gw) =
2φ
m+1 e R.
Thus, the payoﬀ that each party i could expect under war, V w
i , is
V w
i = V w =
φ
m+1 e R, i = 1,2, (27)
which is decreasing in war’s destruction (1−φ > 0) and the eﬀectiveness of conﬂict (m),
but increasing in the mean value of the initial resource (e R ≡ 1
2[R1 + R2]).
4.2.2 Equilibrium under settlement: Division by winning probabilities
Now we suppose that both sides expect that they will be able to agree in stage 2 on a
division of total output according to their winning probabilities: δi(G1,G2) = pi(G1,G2),
as speciﬁed in (3). Given that expectation, each party i in stage 1 chooses Gi to maximize
V s
i subject to (3) taking the other agent’s choice as given. The associated ﬁrst-order








[2e R − G1 − G2] − pi(G1,G2) = 0, i = 1,2,
are identical to those in the case where war is anticipated, since φ drops out of the latter
expressions, implying that the optimizing guns choices, denoted by G
ps
i i = 1,2 in this
case, are identical to the optimizing choices when open conﬂict is anticipated in stage 2:
Gps = Gw as shown in (26).
26Thus, the condition for an interior optimum when war is destructive is identical to the condition
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This result should not be surprising. Given risk neutrality and the separability of
production in its inputs, Xi i = 1,2, the marginal beneﬁt of guns relative to their
marginal cost under settlement with this rule of division, δi(G1,G2) = pi(G1,G2), is
identical to that under open conﬂict. With the incentive structure unchanged at the
margin, both sides naturally allocate the same amount of resources to guns as they
would under conﬂict, whereby each can ensure that her opponent gains no advantage
in her bargaining position for their negotiations relative to their respective positions of
power if they were to wage war. As a consequence, the quantity of intermediate goods
each brings to the joint production process under settlement is identical to that under
war, and the total amount of butter produced is also unchanged.
However, the equivalence of the players’ allocation to guns when war is anticipated
to that when settlement is anticipated should not be interpreted as an indication of the
irrelevance of the damaging eﬀects of warfare. Those eﬀects do matter, as reﬂected in
the diﬀerence between the size of total pie to be divided under settlement, F(Gps), and
the size the pie contested under open conﬂict, φF(Gw), given by F(Gps) − φF(Gw) =
2(1−φ)
m+1 e R, which is positive by our assumption that war is destructive, 1−φ > 0. Although
the way in which the agents divide the pie under settlement coincides with that under
open conﬂict (pps = pw = 1
2 for i = 1,2), by allowing the agents to avoid the destructive
eﬀects of open conﬂict, settlement with δi(G1,G2) = pi(G1,G2) brings both sides a
higher payoﬀ, V
ps
i , given by
V
ps
i = V ps = 1
m+1 e R, i = 1,2, (28)
which exceeds that which they could expect under war, V w, as shown in (27). The
diﬀerence, given by 1
2[F(Gps) − φF(Gw)] is positive, as argued above, and increasing in
the mean value of the initial resource, e R as well as war’s destructive eﬀects on output,
1−φ, but decreasing in the eﬀectiveness of conﬂict, m. The negative eﬀect of m can be
attributed to its equally negative inﬂuence on butter production under settlement and
under war which is only in the latter case subject to destruction.
4.2.3 Equilibrium under settlement: Split-the-surplus rule of division
Still, one has to wonder if it would be possible for the agents to settle on a division of
their joint product without diverting as many resources to the production of guns. One
alternative division splits the surplus realized relative to the threat point of war equally;
hence, it should not be surprising that this rule is referred to as split-the-surplus. Under
risk neutrality, this rule coincides with the prescription of any symmetric bargaining
solution, including the Nash bargaining solution, and is implementable non-cooperatively
by a number of alternating-oﬀers games [see Mutthoo (1999) or Osborne and RubinsteinEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 25
(1990)]. This rule can be found by simply setting V s
1 −V w
1 = V s
2 −V w
2 for any given G1,G2,
where p1(G1,G2) = p(G1,G2), p2(G1,G2) = 1−p(G1,G2), δ1(G1,G2) = δ (G1,G2) and
δ2(G1,G2) = 1 − δ (G1,G2):
δ(G1,G2) = φp(G1,G2) + 1
2(1 − φ). (29)
We continue to use the power functional form shown in (3). Each party’s share of total
output under settlement, δ for agent i = 1 and 1 − δ for agent i = 2, is a weighted
combination of two possible rules:
(i) the probabilistic contest success function, p(G1,G2); and,
(ii) a 50-50 split of the output outright.
The relative weights are determined by the destruction parameter 1 − φ. When φ is
smaller implying that more output is destroyed in warfare, the conﬂict technology plays
a smaller role in the determination of the distribution of ﬁnal output, and each side’s
choice of guns has a smaller impact on the settlement outcome.
The agents’ optimizing choices for guns made in stage 1, when they anticipate that
they will agree in the second stage to divide their joint product based on (29), will again
be symmetric, but not identical to their choices when they anticipate open conﬂict (or
equivalently to their choices when they anticipate settlement where their joint product
is divided according to their respective winning probabilities). In particular, from the
ﬁrst-order conditions to the optimization problems for agents i = 1,2, given respectively














φ[2e R − G1 − G2] − [1 − δ(G1,G2)] = 0,
with δ(G1,G2) speciﬁed in (29), using (3) and (9), one can ﬁnd the agents’ allocations
to guns in the symmetric equilibrium, denoted by Gss
i :
Gss
i = Gss =
φm
φm+1 e R, i = 1,2. (30)
Since φ < 1, the allocation to guns under settlement with this rule is less than that
under war: Gss < Gps = Gw. The smaller role played by the agents’ guns choices in the
split-the-surplus rule of division induces less equilibrium arming than that which would
emerge either under open conﬂict or under settlement where δi = pi. Furthermore, as
war becomes more destructive (i.e., as φ decreases), the importance of guns in δ(G1,G2)Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 26
falls further, and, as a consequence, so does the equilibrium allocation to guns. Since
the two agents produce the same quantity of guns, pss = 1 − pss = 1
2, implying each
is positioned to secure one-half of total output in their negotiations: δ = 1 − δ = 1
2.
With the production speciﬁcation shown in (14), the agents’ guns choices give us total
output, F(Gss) = 2
φm+1 e R, which exceeds that under war, F(Gw), again provided that
conﬂict is destructive (1−φ > 0). This solution for output and its division according to
δ = 1
2 implies that, under settlement with the split-the-surplus rule of division, party i
can obtain a payoﬀ, V ss
i , equal to
V ss
i = V ss = 1
φm+1 e R i = 1,2, (31)
which is strictly greater than V ps as well as V w. The potential short-term gain from
settlement in this case, given by V ss − V w =
m(1−φ)
(m+1)(φm+1)
e R, is increasing in the mean
value of the initial resource (e R) and in war’s destructive element, 1 − φ, as before, but
also increasing in the eﬀectiveness of conﬂict (m). The positive inﬂuence of m can be
attributed to the reduction in the players’ incentive to arm under this particular rule of
division given any m relative to the case of open conﬂict. That is, butter production
is less sensitive to an increase in m under settlement than it is under open conﬂict.
Although production under conﬂict and settlement both fall with m increases, any given
increase in m causes F(Gss) to fall by less than F(Gw), thereby augmenting the possible
gains under settlement.
4.2.4 Discussion: Rules of division and norms of conduct
There are a variety of other rules which diﬀer with respect to their sensitivity to the
agents’ guns choices. In another, more complex environment, similar to that sketched
above in section 4.1.3, Anbarci et al. (2002) examine the sensitivity of the parties’ arming
choices to rules of division under settlement generated by three alternative bargaining
solution concepts. In their analysis, they ﬁnd that the extent to which a rule depends
on the players’ threats points (i.e., their expected payoﬀs under conﬂict) has a positive
inﬂuence on the extent to which the rule induces guns production under settlement, while
leaving their relative bargaining positions unaﬀected, and thus has a negative eﬀect on
the players’ payoﬀs.27 Their ﬁndings suggest a positive role for norms against threats
27The rules analyzed include: (i) the split-the-surplus rule when there are cardinal preferences; (ii) the
equal-sacriﬁce rule which splits the diﬀerence between the players’ maximum, feasible payoﬀs and their
respective payoﬀs under conﬂict; and, (iii) the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule which is eﬀectively a weighted
average of the ﬁrst two rules. Among those rules, the equal-sacriﬁce rule induces the smallest amount
of guns production, while the the split-the-surplus rule falls at the other end of the spectrum, and the
Kalai-Smorodinsky rule lies in between the two extremes. Anbarci et. al. (2002) suggest that these
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in anarchic settings. In particular, such norms can inﬂuence the conduct of the players
in such a way so as to lower their incentive to arm, without substantively changing the
terms of the settlement, thereby enhancing material welfare, even in the absence of a
higher authority. Other norms and institutions similarly limit arming under anarchy,
though we would not expect that they could substitute fully for guns. Guns will always
be around, for they provide the “last-resort” means of conveying a credible threat to
use force when all else fails. But arming could be supplanted, to a large extent, by
diplomacy and politics, provided that the norms, institutions, and organizations are
widely recognized as relevant to settling disputes.
In a related strand of the literature that can be traced back to Axelrod (1984),
social scientists have modelled the evolution of norms, institutions and organizations
as cooperative equilibria of indeﬁnitely repeated supergames. In such games, the more
individual parties value the future, the larger is the set of feasible outcomes (i.e., those
which can be supported under anarchy), as alternatives preferred by all interested parties
over open conﬂict. This approach, which exploits the repeated game setting with a
dynamic strategy, could provide the rationale for the adoption of rules or norms that
call for lower spending on guns, thereby leaving more resources for the production of
butter.28 However, Powell (1993) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996a) have found, in
diﬀerent settings, that a longer shadow of the future could add to the players’ incentive
to arm under conﬂict. Moreover, as we shall see in the next section, a longer shadow of
the future could reverse their preference ordering of settlement and war, to favor war.
5 Why ﬁght?
Given our discussion identifying a wide variety of factors that tend to create a short-
term preference for settlement over open conﬂict, the emergence of inter-state and civil
wars throughout history might seem puzzling. In what follows, we outline some of the
longstanding and the more recent explanations for why we observe open conﬂict.
5.1 Traditional explanations: Asymmetric information, misperceptions, ir-
rationality
War is often attributed to misperceptions, misunderstandings, or simply to irrationality
and base instincts. But, those seeking a explanation consistent with rational behavior
grow too large. In our simple setting, where the Pareto frontier is linear, all division rules yield the same
solution.
28Garﬁnkel (1990) shows how, for a given rule of division, the set can be restricted by exogenous
factors—namely, the mean and variance of the distribution from which the players’ initial resource
endowments are (identically) drawn. A larger mean increases whereas a mean-preserving spread reduces
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often appeal instead to the sorts of problems that can arise under asymmetric informa-
tion, where the parties involved are assumed to know more about themselves in terms
of their own valuation over what is being disputed and its willingness to bear the risks
of war to ﬁght for it as well as the strength of their own military forces than do their
opponents. If the parties could communicate their privately held and otherwise unver-
iﬁable information to the opponent credibly during the bargaining process, they could
facilitate a peaceful settlement. As discussed above, such an outcome would be prefer-
able to open conﬂict. However, there are incentives to misrepresent that information.
Speciﬁcally, each party would like to appear “tougher” than they truly are—not only in
terms of their resolve to ﬁght, but in terms of the strength of their military forces as
well—to obtain a more advantageous position in the negotiations. Thus, any attempt to
reveal this private information say through verbal communication is not likely to be very
successful. But, Brito and Intriligator (1985) show in their seminal work that war can
emerge in a separating equilibrium as a costly means of communication. Fearon (1995)
suggests along similar lines that, in settings of asymmetric information, war could be
chosen by a country, in a preemptive move, as a costly signal of its strength to others
it may encounter in future negotiations. S´ anchez-Pag´ es (2004) extends this line of rea-
soning to suppose that information about the adversaries’ strength can be transmitted
on the battleﬁeld in limited conﬂict before and during negotiations until a ﬁnal settle-
ment is reached or negotiations breakdown, resulting in a full scale war. Azam and
Mesnard (2003) and Bester and W¨ arneryd (2006) identify conditions under which, given
asymmetric information, a peaceful agreement is not possible.29
5.2 Incomplete contracting in the shadow of the future
War can be rationalized, however, without appealing to problems of information at all.
This alternative explanation, which has been proposed and examined recently by Fearon
(1995), Powell (2006), and ourselves in Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2000), has two key
components:
(i) Although short-term contracts, conditional on arming and under the threat of
conﬂict, can be written, adversaries are unable to enforce long-term contracts on
arming.
(ii) Open conﬂict changes the future strategic positions of the adversaries in diﬀerent
29To be sure, there are circumstances where asymmetric information could alleviate conﬂict. In par-
ticular, W¨ arneryd (2003) shows that, if both parties are equally informed about the value of the prize
they are contesting, the conﬂict between them can be more intense, thereby inducing more arming in
equilibrium, than one would observe if only one of the two parties were fully informed about the value
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ways than a peaceful contract under the threat of conﬂict does.
To illustrate, we extend the one-period model of section 3.1 to two periods, with
period t = 1 representing today and period t = 2 representing the future, and assume
that war is destructive, φ < 1.30 At the beginning of each of the two periods t = 1,2,
there are R = 2R units of a resource which can be consumed directly. The sequence
of actions within each period is as speciﬁed in the previous section: In the ﬁrst stage
of period t, each side makes its guns choice; and, in the second stage of period t, given
their choices of guns Git for i = 1,2, they decide whether to settle on a division of the
resource, R, or to go to war. We assume that, under settlement, the resource is divided
in accordance with (29), which splits the surplus equally.31 In the event of a war in
t = 1, the winning party alone takes possession of the contested resource net of the
war’s destructive eﬀects, φR, for consumption, leaving nothing for the losing party. We
assume further to emphasize war’s longer term eﬀects in the most convenient way, that
the losing party is eliminated all together in the future.32 In this case, the winning party
is able to enjoy, on top of today’s resource endowment, the future endowment, without
any sort of conﬂict and, thus, without any need to arm.33 However, both the current and
future resource endowments are subject to the destructive forces of a war in the current
period.
In this dynamic setting, actions taken in both stages of period t = 1 inﬂuence the
amount of resources available to them in period t = 2. Rational, forward-looking parties
will take this inﬂuence into account when making their period t = 1 choices. But, to do
so, they need to know what would occur in period t = 2 for each possible outcome (war
and settlement) in period t = 1. This perspective accords with the notion of sub-game
30In Garﬁnkel and Skaperdas (2000), we develop this argument within the context of the model of
appropriation and production presented above in 3.2. In other related research, McBride and Skaperdas
(2005) examine an inﬁnite-horizon version of the model presented here, modiﬁed to allow for the possi-
bility that the ﬁnal winner of the conﬂict will have to win multiple battles. Based on related ﬁnite and
inﬁnite horizon models, Bester and Konrad (2004, 2005) extend the scope of the analysis to examine the
eﬀect of asymmetries between the rivals who contemplate whether or not to attack speciﬁc territories.
31In cases where the players are risk neutral and the opportunity cost of guns is constant such that
the Pareto frontier is linear, all symmetric axiomatic bargaining solutions prescribe the same outcome,
which is precisely that which is given by this rule.
32In a more general setting such as that of Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) where there is production
and the production technology exhibits diminishing returns and complementarity in the two parties’
inputs, the qualitative results of this logic would follow through with a less extreme assumption. All that
would be required is that the defeated side’s second-period initial resource is suﬃciently small relative
to that of the victor in the case of open conﬂict.
33Strictly speaking, the contest success function speciﬁed in (3) requires that the remaining party
devote some resources to arming. However, it need only devote an inﬁnitesimal amount to guns to gain
full possession of φR. But, to keep matters simple, we suppose that a party who receives nothing in the
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perfection, an appropriate equilibrium concept for such dynamic games. We therefore
solve the model backwards, starting from the second and ﬁnal period.
5.2.1 Preliminaries: The second-period outcome
In the second and ﬁnal period of the game, neither side has to consider the eﬀects of
their choices for the future; there is no future beyond that period. Hence, the conditions
and constraints eﬀective in the second period are identical to those in the single-period
model.
When there is settlement in the first period. When neither side has been
eliminated by a war in period t = 1, the choices they face in period t = 2 will be
identical to those within the context of a one-period model. That is, as conﬁrmed
below, the destruction caused by war creates a short-term preference for settlement.
Accordingly, party i’s choice of guns maximizes Vi2(G1,G2) = δi(G1,G2)R−Gi, i = 1,2,
where δ1(G1,G2) is given by (29) and δ2(G1,G2) = 1 − δ1(G1,G2). As can be easily






where as previously deﬁned R measures the contested resource in per capita terms.
This expression reveals that the optimizing choice for guns is increasing in the conﬂict
eﬀectiveness parameter, m, and the contested resource R = 1
2R. In addition, since
the relevance of each player’s guns choices for determining its respective share of the
contested resource, by the speciﬁcation of the division rule (29), is negatively related
to the destructiveness of war, −φ, guns production under settlement too is negatively
related to −φ. In fact, given the destructive eﬀects of war (φ < 1), the solution for
guns under settlement with the split-of-surplus division rule (29) in this model, as in the




22, each party gets an equal share of the contested resource, δ = 1−δ =
1
2, which implies the following period t = 2 payoﬀs:







which for φ < 1 is greater than the payoﬀ each side expects under conﬂict (11). Thus,
as claimed above, the short-term preference for settlement is present in this model too
when war is destructive.
When there is war in the first period. Now when there is war in period t = 1,
the winning party need not allocate any valuable resources to arming in period t = 2 toEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 31
ensure a share of the resource, since by assumption the loser is eliminated, with a zero
payoﬀ. In eliminating the opponent, the winning party can avoid the period t = 2 cost
of conﬂict. Still, the destructive eﬀect of combat in period t = 1 carries over into period
t = 2, such that there are only φR = φ2R units of the endowment (where φ < 1) left
for the winner to enjoy. These assumptions are summarized as follows: given that war




φ2R if i wins the war;
0 otherwise,
(34)
for i = 1,2. In this case, either V12 > 0 and V22 = 0 or V12 = 0 and V22 > 0.
5.2.2 Settlement or war? First-period choices
In the ﬁrst period, each party cares about the sum of the payoﬀs it will receive over the
two periods. That is, party i’s two-period objective function is described by:
Wi = Vi1 + λVi2, (35)
for i = 1,2 where λ ∈ (0,1] represents the players’ identical time preference. As revealed
by equations (33) and (34), the second-period payoﬀs depend on ﬁrst-period choices in
a discrete way. In eﬀect, then, the two-period payoﬀs, Wi, depend on what occurs in
the ﬁrst period only—that is, on the party’s ﬁrst-period arming and war-or-settlement
decisions.
When there is war. Using (34) and (35) and letting p(G11,G21) denote side 1’s
probability of winning in period t = 1 and 1−p(G11,G21) denote side 2’s probability of
winning in period t = 1, the war payoﬀs, given Gi1 i = 1,2, are:
Ww
1 = p(G11,G21)φ2R − G11 + λp(G11,G21)φ2R















φ(1 + λ)R − G21. (36b)
Keep in mind that these are expected payoﬀs: the winnings realized by party i in the
event of a victory in the period t = 1 war, compounded over the two periods and weighted
by the party’s probability of winning.
When there is settlement. As before, let δ(G11,G21) ∈ (0,1) denote the share
received by side 1 and thus 1 − δ(G11,G21) denote the share received by side 2 in stageEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 32
2 of the ﬁrst period, given Gi1 for i = 1,2 and the sharing rule negotiated in the second
period under settlement.34 Then, the two-period payoﬀs under settlement, using (33)
and (35), can be written as
Ws






































R − G21. (37b)
In contrast to the two-period payoﬀs under war (36a) and (36b), these payoﬀs are certain.
For any given combination of guns (Gi1, i = 1,2), both sides would be willing to
settle only if there exists at least one λ such that Ws
i ≥ Ww
i for both i = 1,2. No such





1 + λ + λm/2
. (38)
Now, in the limiting case when war is not destructive (φ = 1), regardless of the values
taken on by the other parameters (m ∈ (0,1] and λ ∈ (0,1] > 0), this condition is always
satisﬁed, implying an unequivocal long-term preference for war. The reasoning here is
as follows: When φ = 1, the war and settlement payoﬀs in the ﬁrst period are identical.
Going to war in period t = 1, however, eﬀectively eliminates one of the opponents in the
next period and, with it, the need to arm. In other words, waging war in period t = 1,
when it has no destructive eﬀects, yields both a net total and individual beneﬁt.
More generally, the condition (38) shows that the long-term preference for war is
limited by war’s destructive eﬀects. In addition, the condition reveals that the players’
preference to wage war depends positively on the shadow of the future, λ. The idea here
is as follows: In this dynamic model, war brings beneﬁts to the winner over settlement
not only in the current period but in the future. To the extent that the players tend to
prefer current consumption relative to future consumption, they would discount those
future beneﬁts. But, a higher discount factor, which indicates that the players value
the future by more (i.e., discount the future by less) ampliﬁes further the rewards of
waging a war today relative to settlement.36 The condition (38) shows, in addition,
that the players’ preference for war depends positively on the eﬀectiveness of the conﬂict
34The determination of δ(G11,G21) takes as given the share received by side 1 in period t = 2,
δ
e = δ(G12,G22) = φp(G12,G22)+
1
2(1−φ), which we already found when we solved for the solutions of







35As shown below and as was the case in the one-period model, p =
1
2 always holds in equilibrium.
When p 6=
1
2 the conditions for ﬁnding such an λ are even more stringent.
36We would obtain a similar eﬀect if we were to extend the time horizon of the model, to make the
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technology, m. The intuition here is that a more eﬀective conﬂict technology induces
more guns production under settlement as can be seen in (32), and magniﬁes the potential
gains from eliminating one’s opponent and not having to arm at all in the second period.
Thus, both a longer shadow of the future (λ) and a more eﬀective conﬂict technology
(m) make each party more tolerant of war’s destructive eﬀects.
Although the destructive eﬀects of war give the players a short-term incentive to
settle, in an anarchic setting where writing long-term contracts on arms is not possible,
the importance of the future and the compounding rewards of war enjoyed by the winner
can induce the players to choose war over settlement. That is, waging war brings with
it not simply the chance of taking all of contested resource that remains after combat,
but also the potentially even more appealing prospect of not having an opponent at all
in the next period. The decision to ﬁght does not ignore its downside risk—namely,
the possibility of defeat and being eliminated in the future or more generally being
weakened by the opponent and forced to take a much smaller piece of the pie in the
future. Despite this downside risk, when initially the two parties are roughly equal, each
side could expect a positive net beneﬁt to ﬁghting, due to the asymmetry ﬁghting implies
for the their future relative positions and the consequent reduction in arming it brings.
Hence, the choice to wage a war instead of settling can be rationalized without having to
appeal to misperceptions, or incomplete information about the other side’s preferences
or capabilities.
6 Trade, insecurity, and conﬂict
Thus far, in each party’s choice we have emphasized the trade-oﬀ between production
and appropriation. Another way of making a living according to traditional economic
analysis, however, is trade. That analysis is based on the assumption of perfectly se-
cure endowments and perfect enforcement of these secure endowments. A key, then, to
bringing in conﬂict into the study of trade is to relax that assumption and allow for
imperfect or costly enforcement of property rights. Can trade be impeded by insecurity
and the potential for conﬂict? Can restrictions on exchange, subsidies, taxes, land re-
forms that re-allocate initial endowments ever be (constrained-)eﬃcient in the presence
of appropriation and conﬂict costs? Can autarky ever be superior to free trade under
similar conditions? And getting close today’s world, is globalization always beneﬁcial in
the presence of insecurity?
We will explore such questions in this section. The topic, once one confronts it with
the right framework (which we believe we do here), easily reveals itself to be of immense
empirical and historical signiﬁcance, which unfortunately and curiously has been largely
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themes. First, we consider the case in which all tradeable goods are insecure, and
each party has the choice between secure but less productive autarky versus insecure
but more remunerative production for trade. Second, in the case of a model with an
insecure resource, we explore the possibility that various restrictions of exchange and
other measures viewed as ineﬃcient in a ﬁrst-best world can be eﬃcient responses when
the costs of conﬂict are taken into account. In that subsection we will touch upon
substantive issues as varied as wage subsidies, land reform, and the eﬀects of globalization
in the presence of conﬂict.
6.1 Secure autarky vs. insecure exchange
If parties expect to trade, but do not have completely secure possession of the goods
they expect to trade, then they must take measures to guard against the theft of those
goods by others. We suppose that they do so by arming. If, however, the cost of arming
or more generally defense is suﬃciently high, they might choose not to participate in the
market, and refrain from trade.
To ﬁx ideas we examine a modest extension of the model in section 3.2. Suppose that,
on top of the opportunities shown in (12) to produce guns (Gi) and butter (Xi), each
player can produce Yi, an inferior substitute for butter (say, margarine or just “leisure”).
While inferior to butter, this consumption good is assumed to be immune to capture by
the opponent. The resource constraint with identical parties (Ri = R and βi = 1 for
both i0s) can be expressed as follows:
R = Gi + Xi + Yi/γ, i = 1,2, (39)
where, to express the inferiority of Y to X, we have γ < 1. We can think of the total
quantity of butter ( ¯ B ≡ F(X1,X2) = 2R − G1 − G2) as requiring the collaboration
of, or an ”exchange” between, the two parties so that both parties need to produce a
positive quantity of butter for either party to be able to consume any quantity of it.37
In a standard neoclassical world with perfect enforcement of property rights, where each
party could reap the fruits of its own contribution to butter, there would be neither a
need for guns nor an incentive to produce the inferior good, margarine. In this ideal
case, each party would produce, and keep for its own consumption, R units of butter.
We will refer to such outcomes as ”Nirvana” or ”no-conﬂict” outcomes.
With guns determining the distribution of butter and with margarine production
37Of course, the main point of our example here would be reinforced, and be more convincing, with a
more general function, F(X1,X2), that allows for complementarity, but at considerably higher analytical
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being secure, party i can expect the following payoﬀ:
Vi(G1,G2,Y1,Y2) = pi(G1,G2)(2R − G1 − G2) + γYi, i = 1,2. (40)
In this setting, one of two qualitatively diﬀerent outcomes can emerge in equilibrium:
(i) Autarky. Both parties produce only margarine: Y ∗ = R, thus implying G∗ = 0
and X∗ = 0. The payoﬀs in this symmetric equilibrium are V ∗
i = V ∗ = γR
i = 1,2. Note that this is always a possible outcome, since both parties need to
produce butter in order for either to consume any butter.38 That is, given one
party produces only margarine, the other party’s best response it to produce only
margarine as well. But, when γ > 1
m+1, this outcome is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) Exchange. Both parties produce positive quantities of guns and butter as in the
equilibrium of subsection 3.2.1, G∗
i = G∗ = m
m+1R and X∗
i = X∗ = 1
m+1R i = 1,2,
but no margarine, Y ∗
i = 0 i = 1,2. In this equilibrium, which emerges only when
γ ≤ 1
m+1, the payoﬀs are V ∗
i = V ∗ 1
m+1R, i = 1,2.
The second type of equilibrium is the one in which there is exchange but it requires
each side to have guns as back-up. To have such an equilibrium, though, requires that (i)
autarky is suﬃciently unproductive (γ is low enough) and (ii) conﬂict is not too eﬀective
(m is low enough). Otherwise, the only equilibrium is when each side engages in autarkic
production and no exchange takes place. However, even when the conditions exist for an
exchange equilibrium, it is not necessary for it to be implemented in practice, for autarky
is always an equilibrium and, depending on the values of the various parameters, it could
be the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Both types of equilibria of course yield payoﬀs lower than those of the Nirvana out-
come with perfectly secure property rights. They are also consistent with much of history
and this simple model helps us understand how traders were often indistinguishable from
warriors, or at least that traders had to buy the protection of warriors. The European
explorers of the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centuries who stumbled into the Americas or
opened the way to the East around the Cape of Good Hope were hoping to discover
riches that could come from plunder, from trade or both. To do so, they did have to
have an ample supply of guns. The tendency for long-distance traders to be heavily
armed, or for plunderers to engage in commerce on the side, has been hardly unique to
the European explorers, however. The Classical Athenians, the Vikings, the Russians,
38As suggested above, the same sort of result would obtain if we were to replace this assumption and
the simple, linear speciﬁcation for the total quantity of butter, with a more general functional form,
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the Genovese and the Venetians, the English and the Dutch East India companies all
engaged in both trade and war. In other areas, Bedouins from the desert had plundered
and engaged in long-distance trade before the advent of Islam, whereas afterwards Islam
itself spread through the proselytizing zeal of merchant-warriors. And, the Chinese em-
pire engaged in massive naval expeditions to East Africa and perhaps beyond decades
earlier than the much less impressive expeditions of the European explorers.
To be sure, the rationale for the possible absence of exchange is not simply, as has
been emphasized, for example, in Dixit’s (2004) recent inﬂuential synthesis, that the
other party will cheat, either by not paying or by not delivering the promised goods.
The rationale here is based instead on the costly measures that the parties are induced
to take to avoid being the victims of such cheating. That is to say, the costs of enforcing
trade (with guns) could be quite high. This analytically and conceptually distinct reason
for the diﬃculties with exchange has been explored by Rider (1993), Anderton, Anderton,
and Carter (1999), Hausken (2004) , and Anderson and Marcouiller (2005). These papers
present analyses, typically based on models that are more sophisticated than the one
presented above, of a variety of factors that aﬀect the emergence of exchange or its
absence.
6.2 Insecure resources, trade restrictions and other market interventions
Instead of trade itself being insecure, insecurity and contestation of particular resources
that are inputs in production is another form of insecurity. Such insecurity has been his-
torically common, and continues to be prevalent today, both across and within countries.
Oil, diamonds, and fresh water are examples of contested resources that have received
attention lately [see Klare (2001)]. The oil of the Caspian Sea is not simply contested by
the governments of the countries that surround it, but by the governments of countries
and by private interests well beyond its shores as well as by various private interests
within each of the surrounding countries. Here, we are interested in exploring the eﬀects
of the tradeability of such resources. Though tradeability confers the classical gains from
trade, it can be expected to induce diﬀerent—possibly higher—levels of arming. That
is, to assess the eﬀects of trade, we need to compare the gains from trade against the
(possibly) excess levels of arming that trade may induce.
We illustrate the main ideas using a simpliﬁed version of the framework of Skaperdas
and Syropoulos (2001) for the case of international conﬂicts and a simpliﬁed version of
the framework in Garﬁnkel et al. (2006) for the case of domestic conﬂicts. Consider as
before two parties that can be, depending on the context, countries, groups or individuals.
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claims to land. That is to say, all available land, denoted by To, is contested. Each
party i, however, has a secure endowment of R units of labor, which can be transformed,
on a one-to-one basis, into guns or used in conjunction with land to produce the ﬁnal
good valued for consumption. In keeping with the example we have used throughout this
chapter, we suppose that this good is “butter,” B. The following Cobb-Douglas function
describes the production of output, B, given any input quantities of land T and labor L:
B = TαL1−α where α ∈ (0,1). (41)
The timing of actions is as follows:
Stage 1 Each party i chooses its allocation of labor to the production of guns, Gi
i = 1,2, leaving R −Gi for the production of butter or trade. The two parties
make their choices simultaneously.
Stage 2 Given the choices of guns and the technology of conﬂict as described in (3) with
m = 1, the contested land is divided according to the winning probabilities. At
this point, party i’s (new) endowment consists of pi(G1,G2)To units of secure
land and R − Gi remaining units of labor.
Stage 3 These new endowments can be traded domestically or, depending on the trade
regime, internationally. Then, given the new quantities of inputs held, each
party i produces butter according to (41). Each party aims to maximize its
own production of butter.
Assume, for convenience, that the two parties treat the prices of land, labor, and guns as
ﬁxed. Taking labor—and guns too, since they are produced on a one-to-one basis from
labor,—as the numeraire, let πiT denote the relative price of land measured in units of
labor, butter, or guns relevant for party i. Under free trade, this price is given by world
markets. Under autarky, it is determined endogenously by the appropriate domestic
market-clearing condition. Given πiT as determined in either trade regime, the value
of each party’s i’s endowment at the beginning of stage 3, following the division of To
under the threat of conﬂict in stage 2, can be written as
πiTTi + Li = πiTpi(G1,G2)To + R − Gi. (42)
Note how this value depends on the amount of guns chosen by both parties.
As can one can verify, the solution to each party i’s third-stage optimization problem
of choosing Ti and Li to maximize (41) subject to (42) given the gun choices made in
stage 1, yields the following value functions:
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where η(πiT) ≡ (1 − α)1−α[α/πiT]α denotes the marginal utility of income. With these
value functions, which reﬂect the parties’ optimizing third-stage choices, given their ﬁrst-
stage guns choices, we now turn to study those ﬁrst-stage choices under autarky and free
trade, whereby we can explore the implications of the two trading regimes for arming
and welfare.
6.2.1 Outcomes under autarky
When barriers prevent trade across national borders, each party i in stage 1 chooses Gi
to maximize its respective payoﬀ, V T
i (G1,G2;πiT), shown in (43) with πiT = πA
iT which
is taken as given, subject to the conﬂict technology shown in (3) with m = 1 and the
labor resource constraint Gi ≤ R.
The speciﬁc market-clearing conditions that determine πA
iT depend on whether the
parties are countries (engaged in interstate conﬂict) or adversaries within a single coun-
try (engaged in domestic conﬂict). In the former case, the autarkic price for each party
(or country) i would be determined endogenously as a function of the party’s respec-
tive labor and land endowments: πA
iT = α
1−α[R − Gi]/Ti, which would be identical for
i = 1,2 given our symmetry assumptions. When the parties are adversaries within a
single country, the possibility of trade between them implies the autarkic price is deter-
mined endogenously by an aggregate domestic, market-clearing condition that is common
to them: πA
T = α
1−α[2R − G1 − G2]/To. Note, however, under our deterministic inter-
pretation of the conﬂict technology—i.e., where To is divided according to the parties’
winning probabilities,—ex ante symmetry translates into ex post symmetry, such that no
trade between domestic groups actually takes place under autarky. Accordingly, the two
market-clearing solutions shown above yield the same equilibrium value for the autarkic
price, as shown below.
The ﬁrst-order condition to each party i’s optimization problem in the absence of













= 0 i = 1,2. (44)
where the marginal eﬀect of party i’s guns choice on its share of land is shown in (9)
with m = 1. These conditions and either solution for πA
iT—either that which applies to
interstate conﬂict or that which applies to intrastate conﬂict—imply a unique interior
symmetric solution for guns under autarky, GA
i :
GA∗
i = GA∗ = α
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The optimizing guns choice for each party is proportional to its labor endowment, R, and
also positively related to α, which measures the importance of land in the production of
butter.
6.2.2 Outcomes under trade
When the barriers to trade are removed, each party i in stage 1 chooses Gi, subject to
the resource constraint Gi ≤ R, to maximize its respective payoﬀ as shown in (43), where
πiT = πT, which is given in world markets. The ﬁrst-order conditions to this problem











= 0 i = 1,2, (46)
with (9), are essentially the same as the ﬁrst-order conditions (i = 1,2) to the analogous
problem under autarky (44). But, these conditions, in which πT is exogenously given,
imply the following equilibrium choices for guns:
GT∗
i = GT∗ = 1
4πTTo, i = 1,2. (47)
Note how the optimizing choice of guns under trade is increasing in the value of the
contested resource, πTTo, whereas the equilibrium choice of guns under autarky GA∗
(45a) is not related at all to the contested resource but instead to the secure resource,
R, and the parameter that indicates its relative importance in the production of butter.
Thus, the incentives to arm in the two regimes are quite diﬀerent. These qualitative
diﬀerences, in turn, imply that the incentives to arm under trade tend to be greater than
those under autarky when (i) the endowment of land is larger relative to that of labor
(To/R), (ii) when the price of land is larger relative to labor (πT), and (iii) when land is
less important in production (α).
6.2.3 The relative appeal of free trade
When does trade induce a greater production of guns, and are the added costs of conﬂict
in this case suﬃciently large to swamp the gains from trade relative to autarky? To
answer these questions, we now compare equilibrium welfare under the two regimes.
Combining the solution for guns (45a) and the market-clearing price (45b) with the
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, i = 1,2. (49)
These equilibrium payoﬀs, like those obtained under the conventional assumption that
all resources are secure, can be shown to be strictly quasi-convex in the price of land,
πT, reaching a minimum at a certain price, πmin
T . As is well known, in the case that
all resources are secure so that there is neither interstate nor intrastate conﬂict, this
minimum price equals the autarkic price. However, where resources are insecure, this
critical price is strictly greater than the autarkic price, πA∗
T .39 Furthermore, given the
strict quasi-convexity of V T∗(πT), there exists another price, π0
T > πmin
T deﬁned uniquely
by the condition, V T∗(πA∗
T ) = V A∗ = V T∗(π0
T).
With these critical values of πT, the central results of the model are illustrated in
Figure 1. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁgure depicts the parties’ payoﬀs under free trade (V T∗(πT))
relative to their payoﬀs under autarky (V A∗) as a function of the relative price of land
(πT).
(i) For πT < πA
T and πT > π0
T, welfare under autarky is higher than welfare under
trade (V A∗ > V T∗(πT)).
(ii) For πA
T < πT < π0
T, welfare under trade is higher than welfare under autarky:
(V T(πT) > V A).
The underlying logic here is straightforward: When the international price of land is
suﬃciently low (i.e., πT < πA
T ), the two parties devote fewer labor resources into guns
relative to what they would choose under autarky, since they know that they can use
their labor in global markets to buy land cheaply in the third stage. As such, a shift away
from the autarkic regime to free trade brings with it not only the familiar gains from
trade, but also a reduction in the cost of conﬂict. When the price equals the autarkic
price, πT = πA
T , the gains from trade are zero and the costs of conﬂict under autarky
are identical to those under trade. But, when the international price of the contested
resource is higher than its autarkic price, πT > πA
T , the stakes of the conﬂict are higher,
thereby inducing the parties to allocate more labor resources to guns under the trade
regime relative to the autarkic regime, and the additional cost of conﬂict more than
oﬀsets the gains from trade. In this case, a shift from autarky to trade induces a welfare
loss. Only when the price of land is suﬃciently high (i.e., , πT > π0
T) will the gains from
trade again be greater than the additional costs of guns under trade.























Figure 1: Free trade vs autarchy in the presence of conﬂict
Thus, trade can be welfare-reducing in the presence of conﬂict over valuable resources.
The particular assumption of price-taking behavior is made for convenience only and
can easily be relaxed without changing the main ﬁndings. Skaperdas and Syropoulos
(2002), for example, allow for bargaining over the price of land, whereas Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996b) allow for inﬂuence on the terms of trade. By the same token, the
ﬁndings do not hinge on the particular way in which conﬂict has been modelled here.
Findlay and Amin (2000), for instance, consider a trade model in which security is
modelled as a public good and is increasing in one country’s defense expenditures and
decreasing in the defense expenditures of the another country. They similarly ﬁnd that
the gains from trade can be outweighed by the higher defense costs brought about by
trade.
6.2.4 Other implications
As should be clear by now, the model we have just analyzed can apply to interstate
as well as intrastate conﬂicts with minimal modiﬁcations. Interstate conﬂicts had been
frequent and very costly up to World War II. World War I, in particular, took place just
after the ﬁrst big era of globalization, which was also an era of intense competition for
colonies and resources between the Great powers. Since World War II, however, while the
frequency of interstate wars has fallen, civil wars have increased in frequency. Indeed,
most of the carnage and, arguably, much economic stagnation and even retrogression
since World War II can be attributed civil wars [see Collier et. al. (2003)].
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source curse,” the tendency of many resource-rich countries to have low or negative rates
of growth despite the high prices of their exports. Trade not only makes exporters of
contested resources worse oﬀ relative to the autarkic regime; it also leaves them vulnera-
ble to declining welfare as increases in the prices for their exports would tend to increase
the cost of domestic conﬂict. As Mehlum et. al. (2006) argue, the key appears to be the
security and governance of potentially contestable resources. Countries that have solved
the problem of conﬂict over resources do well, whereas those that have not solved the
problem can face declining welfare in the face of the seeming (and ﬂeeting) prosperity
that can come from higher oil or other export prices.
The comparison between autarky and complete trade openness is too stark for many
contexts. In practice, there are a number of other instruments that countries, groups,
or even individual actors could employ to minimize the potentially harmful conﬂict costs
of greater openness to trade and exchange. Authors have argued in diﬀerent but similar
contexts that wage subsidies [Zak (1995) and Grossman (1995)], land reform [Horowitz
(1993) and Grossman (1994)], and market interventions in general [Dal Bo and Dal Bo
(2004)] can be optimal in the face of various types of conﬂict, from common crime, to
low-level political conﬂict, to insurrections, civil wars, and interstate wars.
Another way to think of the conﬂict costs that we have explored in this section
in relation to trade and exchange is as a large component of the often-discussed, yet
rarely modelled or operationalized, concept of “transaction costs.” Taking these costs
into account indicates that exchange is neither likely to emerge nor necessarily optimal
in a second-best world, and can explain many practices and institutions that would be
diﬃcult to comprehend in a world with zero enforcement and conﬂict costs.
7 Coalitions and group formation
The line of research we have reviewed in this chapter has made much progress in ad-
vancing our understanding of how conﬂict manifests itself in many diﬀerent aspects of
our economic lives. This research, however, leaves unanswered many questions about
possible “solutions.” For example, how can we explain the shift in the nature of conﬂict
that occurred before and after the two world wars? Is this shift one that we can expect
to persist or will it eventually reverse itself? Furthermore, why have only some countries
been able to solve the problems of security and governance? While it might be overly
optimistic or pretentious to believe that the approach adopted here could oﬀer any use-
ful insights into such important questions, it seems reasonable to suppose that a good
starting point would be to develop a working theory of group formation in the presence
of distributional conﬂict.
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this assumption simpliﬁes matters tremendously, it prevents us from considering other
issues that are directly related to the tradeoﬀ between guns and butter. In thinking
about why individuals would want to become allies, one might naturally suppose that
there are cost-saving advantages that they can realize when they join forces in defending
their property against a common enemy [Noh (2002)].40 Or, along similar lines, one
could suppose that the impact of pooled eﬀorts is greater than the sum of the eﬀects
of individual eﬀorts [Skaperdas (1998)]. In this case, individuals form groups to exploit
increasing returns (or super-additivity) in the conﬂict technology. Of course, the beneﬁts
aﬀorded by specialization and increasing returns in production would also provide some
basis for group formation.
One could also argue, though, that individual incentives to free-ride would tend to
undermine the eﬀectiveness of collective action [Olson (1965)]. For example, where indi-
viduals come together in a group to contest some resource, each individual’s willingness
to contribute to the collective eﬀort would be decreasing in the group’s size, since what-
ever is contested, if won, would have to be shared with the other members, whereas the
cost of the contribution is borne privately by the individual. To be sure, this reason-
ing suggests, at the same time, that the severity of conﬂict between groups would be
diminished by group formation. Nevertheless, one has to acknowledge that, with group
formation, there could be an additional source of conﬂict—namely, over how to allocate
whatever the group produces and/or appropriates among the group’s members. How
does group formation and the ability of groups to manage conﬂict among their mem-
bers inﬂuence the equilibrium severity of conﬂict? What sorts of group structures are
more conducive to less severe conﬂict at both the aggregate and the group levels? Are
such structures more or less likely to be be stable in equilibrium—i.e., not subject to
deviations?
Surprisingly, while there is a relatively large literature on military alliances41 and
more recently on endogenous group formation, very little has been written on group
formation in the context of models of distributional conﬂict. In this section, we review
the relevant literature, highlighting what advances have been made thus far in addressing
these and related issues.
40Also see Sandler (1999). In a related though distinct line of research, Alesina and Spolaore (2006)
consider the importance of international conﬂict in the equilibrium determination of the size and number
of the nation-states.
41This literature dates back to Olson and Zeckhauser’s (1966) seminal paper. See Sandler and Hartley
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7.1 Stage 1: Inter-group conﬂict
We organize our discussion around a simpliﬁed model of sequential conﬂict, which
builds on the framework presented in section 3.1, along the lines of W¨ arneryd (1998)
and Esteban and S´ akovics (2003).42 There are N identical, risk-neutral individuals,
I = {1,2,...,N}, who participate in a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, all individ-
uals participate in a winner-take-all contest over a resource R, which can be consumed
directly. They participate either collectively with others or alone, as dictated by the
structure of groups, which we take here as given. A group is deﬁned as any subset of the
population, Ak ⊆ I, with membership nk ≥ 1, where k = 1,2,...,A and A denotes the
total number of groups. For future reference, let the structure of groups be indicated
by S = {n1,n2,...,nA}, with the groups ordered such that n1 ≥ n2 ≥ n3 ··· ≥ nA. By
deﬁnition, all individuals belong to a group. However, a group need not include more
than one member. Moreover, this framework admits the possibility that everyone comes
together to form a single group—the grand coalition: A1 = {1,2,...,n}.
For any given conﬁguration of groups, each individual i, a member of some group k,
chooses gi, her contribution to her group’s appropriative eﬀort, Gk ≡
P
i∈Ak gi. Then,
the probability that group k wins and successfully secures the entire resource, R, depends

















for all k. This speciﬁcation is based on the symmetric class of conﬂict technologies for
the n-party case, shown in (2), taking the functional form f(·) = Gm. To capture the
special advantages that groups enjoy over individuals in appropriative activities, one




i∈Ak f(gi), or given f(·) = Gm that m > 1.43 However, we abstract from any such
advantages here, supposing instead that m = 1. This assumption simpliﬁes the analytics
considerably, allowing us to show more clearly how the presence of groups inﬂuences
the structure of incentives and thus the aggregate intensity of conﬂict. One important
inﬂuence relates to the public-good nature of arming in the contest for R. In particular,
appropriative eﬀorts by diﬀerent members of a given group are perfect substitutes for one
another. Regardless of who provides additional eﬀort, all members enjoy the increased
42For an extended analysis based on a model that includes production, see Garﬁnkel (2004a,b).
43Skaperdas (1998) shows, in the case where n = 3, that super-additivity is necessary to make indi-
viduals of the group strictly better oﬀ than they would be under individual conﬂict. Noh (2002) obtains
a similar result with a slightly diﬀerent (asymmetric) speciﬁcation to admit the possibility that groups
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probability of securing the resource it brings to the group.
7.2 Stage 2: Intra-group conﬂict
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that group k, with nk > 1 emerges as the winner of the ﬁrst-
stage contest. Individuals not belonging to that group, i ∈ Ak0 where k0 6= k, receive
nothing, implying that their ﬁrst-stage eﬀorts result only in a loss over the two stages.44
However, each member of the winning group, i ∈ Ak, goes on to participate in a second-
stage contest that determines the distribution of R among the group’s members. In
particular, assume that the share of that resource enjoyed by individual i ∈ Ak, σik,
depends on her eﬀort si, distinct from gi, and on the eﬀort by everyone else in her group,
sj for j 6= i ∈ Ak or s−i. But her share need not depend entirely on those eﬀorts. More

















where µ ∈ (0,1] for all i ∈ Ak. For groups having only one member (nk = 1), there is
no internal competition, implying that s = 0.
The assumption embedded in (51), that members of the group, with nk > 1, must
compete for a share of the prize (µ > 0), departs from the assumption made by others—
e.g., Baik and Lee (2001), Noh (2002) and Bloch et. al. (2006), that binding com-
mitments to sharing rules between group members are possible.45 However, this general
formulation also admits the possibility that social institutions can mediate conﬂict within
the group, and in doing so have implications for intergroup conﬂict.46 In the context of
this model, the fraction 1 − µ ≥ 0 measures the eﬀectiveness of existing mechanisms of
conﬂict management to determine the distribution of the group’s product without having
to rely on the members’ current appropriative activities. Put diﬀerently, smaller values
of µ would reﬂect stronger social institutions to eﬀect a less costly resolution of group
conﬂict. In what follows, however, we abstract from such inﬂuences, and assume that
µ = 1, not only to keep matters simple but to emphasize the importance of continuing
conﬂict among the members within the winning group.47
44As speciﬁed below, the individual’s payoﬀ would be Vik0 = −gi. In other words, the ﬁrst-stage
conﬂict weakens individuals i ∈ Ak0 suﬃciently such that it is not possible for them to try to steal the
product from the winning group in the second-stage conﬂict.
45In those models, there is essentially no conﬂict after the ﬁrst stage.
46Of course, this analysis can say nothing about the emergence of such institutions. Genicot and
Skaperdas (2002) look speciﬁcally at individual investment in conﬂict management within groups. Re-
lated analyses which have considered more speciﬁcally the interrelations between democratic political
institutions and international conﬂict, include Garﬁnkel (1994) and Hess and Orphanides (1995, 2001).
47For a more general analysis based on (51), see Garﬁnkel (2004b). Also see Niou and Tan (2005) whoEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 46
7.3 Equilibrium allocations







subject to (50) with m = 1 and (51) with µ = 1, where Gk =
P
i∈Ak gi, as previously
deﬁned. The terms inside the square brackets together represent the payoﬀ to the in-
dividual, contingent on her group winning the ﬁrst-stage contest. Accordingly weighted
by the probability that her group wins that contest, this contingent payoﬀ equals her
share of the contested resource net of her eﬀorts expended in securing that share. The
second term is the utility cost of her contribution made in the ﬁrst stage to the group’s
eﬀort in that contest. In choosing her contribution to the group’s eﬀort, she will consider
not only that cost—a cost she bears alone regardless of whether the group wins or loses
the ﬁrst-stage contest—but also the inﬂuence of that contribution on her second-stage
choices through the conﬂict success function. Thus, we follow the strategy adopted ear-
lier in this chapter in accordance with the equilibrium notion of sub-game perfection.
That is, we solve the model backwards, starting with the second and ﬁnal stage.
Second-stage outcome. Each individual i belonging to the winning group, k,
chooses si to maximize Vik = σik(si,s−i)R − si − gi subject to (51) with µ = 1, tak-
ing the other group members’ choices, s−i, as given. The conﬂict technology (51) with
µ > 0 generally implies that si = 0 for all i ∈ Ak cannot be an equilibrium outcome. As









2R = 1, (53)
for i ∈ Ak. Symmetry of the group’s membership, in turn, implies si = s > 0. With this










R − gi, (54b)
for i ∈ Ak. In this equilibrium, each member of the winning group enjoys an equal share
of the contest prize, σ(nk) = 1
nk, which is decreasing in the size of the group, nk. At the
same time, a larger nk implies a greater diversion of eﬀort away from other (presumably
valuable) activities towards security. As such, the payoﬀ to the individual is decreasing
in the square of the size of the group.
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First-stage outcome. Now consider the ﬁrst-stage conﬂict between groups, again
with the structure of groups ﬁxed. Each individual i belonging to group k chooses gi to
maximize the expected value of (54b), given by
V e
i (nk) = pk(Gk,G−k) 1
n2
k
R − gi, (55)
where Gk =
P
i∈Ak gi subject to (50) with m = 1. Individuals in all A groups make their
decisions simultaneously. The presence of the weight 1
n2
k
on the ﬁrst term in (55) reﬂects
the negative eﬀects of group size mentioned above—the greater dilution of the prize, ¯ R,
and the greater diversion of valuable eﬀort that is positively related to the prize as well.
These eﬀects detract from the beneﬁts an individual expects to realize as a result of her
contributions to the group’s collective eﬀort in the ﬁrst-stage conﬂict. The cost to the
individual of making such contributions, by contrast, is independent of her group’s size.
Accordingly, one would expect her choice of gi to be negatively related to the size of her
group.




i∈Aj gi > 0, a fully interior
solution is not guaranteed for all conﬁgurations of groups when A > 2. That is to say,
the members of one or more groups might choose gi = 0. But, the stability of a given
conﬁguration requires that all groups actively participate in the second-stage conﬂict.48
The analysis to follow, then, considers only such solutions. Accordingly, the individual’s
















Maintaining focus on the case of within-group symmetry,49one can ﬁnd, based on (56),
the equilibrium eﬀort put forth by each individual belonging to group k of size nk, given












48The basic idea is that, by participating in the intergroup conﬂict as a stand-alone group any individual
can ensure herself a strictly positive expected payoﬀ, which exceeds the zero payoﬀ obtained by individuals
belonging to those groups who do not participate at all. See Garﬁnkel (2004a).
49Since the probability of winning R depends on the group’s eﬀort Gk, not just the individual member’s
eﬀort gi for i ∈ Ak, only total eﬀort by the group is uniquely determined; individual eﬀort, gi, is not.
Our focus on within-group symmetry seems most natural given the assumption that individual members
of the group are identical.
50Speciﬁcally, rewrite (56) as R( ¯ G − nkgk) = ¯ G
2n
2
k, where ¯ G ≡
PA
j=1 Gj denotes the aggregate eﬀort





Simplifying and rearranging shows that, in equilibrium, ¯ G = R(A − 1)/H, which with the expression
above in gk and ¯ G, yields (57). Note our requirement that gk > 0 for all k is satisﬁed provided that
H > (A − 1)n
2
k holds for nk = n1, the number of members in the largest group.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 48
For any given group structure with gk > 0 for all k, the solution for g(nk,S) reveals
that the equilibrium eﬀort by the individual members of group k in the intergroup
conﬂict is decreasing in the size of the group, nk, as is the total eﬀort by the group,
Gk = nkg(nk,S). Hence, the probability of winning the conﬂict in stage 2, given by
p(nk,S) = 1
H[H − (A − 1)n2
k] for A > 1, is also decreasing in the group size, nk.
Using this expression for p(nk,S), (55) and (57), the payoﬀ expected by each individual
member of group k at the beginning of stage one, V e(nk,S), can be written as




H − (A − 1)n2
k

H − (A − 1)nk

R (58)
for k = 1,2,...,A. Not surprisingly then, given any structure of groups, S, where gk > 0
for k = 1,2,...,A, individuals belonging to larger groups expect a smaller payoﬀ than
the payoﬀ expected by those belonging to smaller groups:
V e(n1,S) ≤ V e(n2,S) ≤ ··· ≤ V e(nA,S) (59)
where by assumption n1 ≥ n2 ≥ ... ≥ nA.51 Of course, this ranking says nothing about
an individual’s incentive to move from one group to another, as it does not account for
the eﬀect of the hypothetical move on the eﬀorts levels g by anyone in the stage-two
conﬂict or others’ incentive to move in response. However, it should be clear that group
formation in this setting generates positive spill-over eﬀects.
7.4 The level of conﬂict under diﬀerent symmetric group structures
To give just a ﬂavor for how the structure of groups can inﬂuence the intensity of conﬂict,
we focus our attention on symmetric structures. In the case where all groups are of equal
size n ≥ 1, S ≡ ˆ S = {n,...,n},52 the solution shown in (57) simpliﬁes to g(n, ˆ S) =
N−n
N2n R. The two extreme symmetric cases of interest are (i) individual conﬂict where
n = 1 and A = N, and (ii) the grand coalition where n = N and A = 1. In the case of
individual conﬂict, the solution simpliﬁes even further to g(1, ˆ S) = N−1
N2 R. By contrast,
when the grand coalition forms the solution is g(n, ˆ S) = 0. As can easily be conﬁrmed,
under alternative, less extreme symmetric structures given N(= An), 1 ≤ n ≤ N,
g(n, ˆ S) is decreasing in n or equivalently increasing in A. However, to account for the
eﬀect of group structure on the level of conﬂict, we wish to factor in the conﬂict that
51One might conjecture that this ranking depends on the assumption, commonly made in the literature
as well as in this paper, of linear costs of eﬀort in the intergroup conﬂict. Analyzing a model of collective
action (with eﬀectively just one layer of conﬂict), Esteban and Ray (2001) show that, if instead these costs
are increasing suﬃciently quickly in eﬀort (or money as the case may be), then the group’s probability
of winning the conﬂict would be increasing in its size. Nevertheless, they also ﬁnd that, if the prize is
purely private as in the present analysis, the expected payoﬀ to each member would be decreasing in
group size.
52Ignoring integer problems in the symmetric case, A = N/n and H = Nn.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 49
takes place at both stages. In particular, we calculate the expected allocation to the
intergroup and intragroup conﬂict for the representative group and then sum across all
A groups. Noting that, for symmetric group structures where nk = n for all k, we have
that p(n,N) = 1
A = n
N; and, from (54a), we have s(n) = n−1
n2 . Bringing these elements
together after simplifying yields
A








As this expression shows, given the total number of individuals N, the intensity of
conﬂict is decreasing monotonically in the number of groups, A. Hence, as we move
from a structure with a small number of large groups towards individual conﬂict, the
intensity of conﬂict decreases.
To be sure, using (58), one can verify that the payoﬀ an individual could expect under
a symmetric group structure with n > 1 is strictly greater than what she can expect
under individual conﬂict (i.e., where n = 1). Nevertheless, this diﬀerence is decreasing in
the size of each group (n > 1) and equals 0 when when n = N or A = 1. That is to say,
the potential gains under the symmetric group structure are decreasing once individuals
pair up, and continue to diminish as the groups grow, eventually disappearing—that is,
once the group becomes as large as the population, or the grand coalition.
In the context of this simple model, the expected gains from (symmetric) group
formation come in the form of a reduction in the severity of conﬂict over the contestable
resource R for 1 < n < N. No member of a group with n > 1 fully internalizes the
beneﬁts of her eﬀorts in that conﬂict and so naturally devotes less eﬀort to it. In the
symmetric outcome, everyone else is doing just the same, so that, when compared to
the case of individual conﬂict (n = 1), no one has gained an advantage in the conﬂict
over R relative to anyone else, yet everyone has a greater chance of winning, 1
A > 1
N.
However, as n > 1 increases and the ﬁrst-stage conﬂict between groups weakens, the
second-stage conﬂict over the distribution of R within the group intensiﬁes; from an ex
ante perspective, the increased costs associated with the intensifying intragroup conﬂict
exceed the decreased costs associated with the weakening intergroup conﬂict. As n
approaches N, the expected gains from group formation go to zero. Of course, the
actual outcome under group formation with n = N will diﬀer from that under individual
conﬂict by virtue of the diﬀerence in the nature of the conﬂict in the two outcomes.
But, by our assumption that µ = 1, the group is no more eﬃcient in resolving conﬂict
than individuals are on their own; therefore, assuming risk neutrality, shifting the entire
conﬂict from one between A = N groups of size n = 1 to a conﬂict within A = 1 group
among n = N members has no consequences in terms of expected payoﬀs.53 Still, for
53If the members of a group could credibly agree to share the product equally without arming (s = 0),Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 50
n < N, the formation of symmetric group on net enhances expected welfare.
7.5 Requirements of stability and equilibrium group structures
Would that expected beneﬁt be suﬃcient to render a symmetric group structure, ˆ S, a
stable equilibrium? In the absence of any speciﬁc beneﬁts from belonging to a group
(i.e., in terms of the conﬂict or production technologies), it should be fairly obvious that,
for any given group structure S, each individual would have a large incentive to break
away from her own group to form a stand-alone group. The logic here is quite simple.
As discussed earlier, each member’s incentive to contribute to her own group’s collective
eﬀort in the ﬁrst-stage contest over R is decreasing in the size of her group. Hence,
once having broken away from her group to stand by herself, given the membership of
all other groups and that of her former group, any individual would have an increased
incentive to put forth some eﬀort in the conﬂict over R. At the same time, this deviation
would likely decrease the eﬀort made by members of groups not directly aﬀected by the
deviation. By forming a stand-alone group, the individual could, then, put herself in a
very advantageous position to win the ﬁrst-stage contest over R and she could keep it
all for herself.
While this line of reasoning questions the stability of the original structure, one can
go a step further to question the stability of the deviation itself, for other individuals
too will have an incentive to break away from their respective groups. This is precisely
the approach of the noncooperative theory of endogenous coalition structures—see, e.g.,
Bloch (1996), Chwe (1994), Ray and Vohra (1999), and Yi (1997)—which has recently
been applied to group formation in distributional conﬂict. This approach deﬁnes a
stable equilibrium by imposing certain internal consistency requirements on possible
deviations. One extreme possibility, based on Chwe’s (1994) notion of farsighted stability,
envisions individuals as looking at the ultimate outcome of a deviation. That is, in their
evaluation of the potential gains from a given deviation, they factor in the possibility of
all subsequent deviations by others and the resulting impact on expected payoﬀs. In the
context of this model, although any individual would beneﬁt, for example, by leaving
her group to form a stand-alone group given the membership of the other groups and her
former group, such deviations could ultimately trigger a reversion to individual conﬂict,
leaving everyone, including the original deviator, worse oﬀ. Accordingly, such deviations
themselves would be deemed unproﬁtable and, thus, would not pose a threat to the
stability of the group structure under consideration. In eﬀect, invoking the notion of




would be increasing in n, so that the expected gains under group formation relative to individual conﬂict,
n−1
Nn R, would also be increasing in n and be strictly positive when evaluated at n = N.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 51
farsighted stability expands the opportunities for “cooperation” among individuals who
would behave otherwise in a noncooperative way.
A common requirement of stability of the structure of groups in such settings with
positive spill-over eﬀects is that the groups be of roughly the same size [Yi (1997)].
Asymmetric structures create larger incentives for deviations particularly for members
of the larger groups, and more so when N is small. When there are only 3 individuals,
a stable group structure is impossible [Esteban and S´ akovics (2003)], unless the alliance
enjoys some advantage in the conﬂict technology [Skaperdas (1998) and Noh (2002)].
More generally, in such settings for any N, the failure of the grand coalition to emerge
as a stable group structure is common. However, this failure cannot be attributed to
the positive spill-over eﬀects of group formation alone. For example, Bloch et al. (2006)
predict the emergence of the grand coalition despite the presence of such spill-over ef-
fects. In fact, in that model, the grand coalition is the eﬃcient outcome. The reason
is because the solution concept, based on Bloch (1996), assumes that the members of a
group can commit to an equal sharing rule of whatever they win, thereby abstracting
from the intragroup conﬂict all together. By contrast, when resolving the conﬂict be-
tween members within a group is just as costly as resolving conﬂict between any other
two individuals, smaller groups are more eﬃcient [Garﬁnkel (2004a)]. Even when one
supposes that groups have an advantage in conﬂict management (µ < 1), there remains
a tendency for structures with smaller groups to yield greater expected payoﬀs for all
[Garﬁnkel (2004b)]. Though the grand alliance could be stable when groups are better
able to manage conﬂict (µ < 1), there are other structures that strictly dominate it from
everyone’s perspective.
Because scholars have only begun to study group formation and its eﬀects on conﬂict
and peace, there are many avenues for future research. Of special importance would be
the study of conﬂict management within groups. One might adopt a dynamic approach,
supposing that the survival of groups over time requires the creation and maintenance of
“norms” and institutions that would allow the alliance members to eﬀect a more “peace-
ful” distribution of output at a lower cost.54 In addition, the literature has paid scant
attention to asymmetries. Yet, the heterogeneity of individuals raises some important
and interesting issues about the composition of alliances and about resolving conﬂicts
therein, provided that a stable structure exists at all.
54See Genicot and Skaperdas (2002) who model conﬂict management as an investment decision in a
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8 Dynamics and growth
Up to this point, section 5.2 is the only place in which we have explicitly examined
dynamic issues. Page constraints preclude us from developing a model in which we
could examine most of the issues that have been analyzed in the literature. Instead, the
following paragraphs summarize some of the central themes.55
The costs of conflict over time reduce welfare compared to the case
without conflict. This ﬁnding, which is obvious, is present in all of the papers
in this area, but is virtually absent from other models of growth that have dominated
thinking in this area. Similarly, research on economic development has largely overlooked
the costs of conﬂict and more generally the costs of unproductive activities [on which
Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994) and Barelli and Pessoa (2004) have focused]. This
omission is rather astounding given the obvious empirical importance of these costs,
which has been recently corroborated by a World Bank study [Collier, et. al., (2003)]
and the empirical analysis of Hess (2003).56
The incentives for productive innovation are severely reduced in the pres-
ence of conflict. Baumol (1990) has provided an intuitive discussion of the im-
portance of secure property rights for productive innovation to ﬂourish. But one can
go beyond the basic intuition with the use of appropriate modelling to develop sharp
insights. In particular, building on the result based on the benchmark model of section
3.2, Gonzales (2005) demonstrates that, where property is insuﬃciently insecure, an
economic agent might choose not to adopt superior technologies (i.e., those with higher
βi’s). The reason is not simply because the returns from innovation are expected to be
partially expropriated. There is, in addition, a strategic element at play here. That
is, the adoption of new technologies by one agent would be expected to induce greater
relative guns production by the other agents, thereby placing the innovating agent in a
disadvantaged position. Thus, even when superior technologies are available at zero cost,
the eﬀect of such innovations to make one more vulnerable to appropriation can lead to
their rejection in favor of inferior technologies, an outcome that Gonzalez reasonably
argues was relevant to many periods in history.
55The interested reader should consult the relevant references, including Sturzenegger and Tommasi
(1994), Hirshleifer (1995a), Zak (1995), Grossman and Kim (1996), Lee and Skaperdas (1998), Barelli
and Pessoa (2004), and Gonzalez (2005, 2006).
56Hess(2003), for example, estimates the welfare costs of conﬂict coming from its eﬀects on consump-
tion alone for 147 countries spanning the period 1960–1992 to be on average 8 percent of steady-state
consumption. For some countries, the eﬀect is lower (e.g., 3.2 percent for the United States), but the
eﬀect for others, especially the lower income countries, the estimated eﬀect is considerably higher (e.g.,
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Productive versus appropriative capital accumulation. The tradeoﬀ be-
tween production and appropriation exists not only for outputs with short-term dura-
bility. After all, guns typically last a number of years, as so do barracks, fortiﬁcations,
or siege machines. Such objects can be considered an alternative form of capital, one
that is non-productive and which we can call ”appropriative” or “enforcive.” It could
even be argued that for much of history since the agricultural revolution, this type of
capital has been quantitatively more important and technologically more sophisticated
than ordinary productive capital. Certainly the technology of many castles and siege
machines was far more advanced than anything that was available for civilian, material
use. The same can be said for the organizational eﬃciency of standing armies, as no
equivalent organizations existed in civilian aﬀairs. Lee and Skaperdas (1998) explore
this theme, in a setting where investments in appropriative capital compete with those
in productive capital, ﬁnding that long-run economic performance can be hindered; and,
as with technological choice, this eﬀect can be expected to be dramatic. Thus, diﬀerences
in governance can be expected to induce diﬀerences in capital accumulation. Such diﬀer-
ences could, then, also account for the phenomenon of (ﬁnancial, mobile) capital moving
from poor countries to rich countries, the opposite movement one would expect under
traditional modelling in which property rights are perfectly and costlessly enforced.
Among other themes that have been explored in dynamic models of conﬂict and
appropriation are the eﬀects of initial asymmetries in resource endowments [Sturzeneg-
ger and Tommasi (1994)] and of the degree of property rights enforcement [Gonzalez
(2006)]. Consistent with the results in the static version of asymmetric contest models,
Sturzenegger and Tommasi (1994) ﬁnd that asymmetries in initial endowments tend to
reduce the total resources devoted to appropriation and thus result in enhanced welfare
relative to the case of symmetry. Since Sturzenegger and Tommasi’s analysis is based
on a deterministic model (which is common where structural dynamics are involved),
it would be of interest to examine the case in which the technology of conﬂict has a
probabilistic interpretation (i.e., a “winner-take-all-contest”) and to suppose that the
winner of the contest gains and maintains an advantage in future encounters.57 Using
a version of the asymmetric conﬂict technology in (5) to parameterize the security of
property rights, Gonzalez (2006) shows how, at intermediate levels of security, welfare
can be lower than when insecurity is low or high. That is, welfare is non-monotonic in
the degree of property right security. Thus, one should exercise caution in recommend-
57Another area of interest is the simultaneous examination of appropriative conﬂict and open-access
resources. Reuveny and Maxwell (2001) have developed such a promising dynamic model. However, dis-
tinguishing between deterministic and probabilistic versions of the model necessitates numerical simula-
tions, which do not appear to yield results that are independent of the parameters used in the particular
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ing improved property-rights enforcement, particularly when such improvements are to
be made incrementally in middle income countries. At the same time, it would be
worthwhile to examine alternative ways of measuring the security of property rights—
for example, by identifying the degree of security by the fraction of one’s output that is
immune to capture by others.
Only the surface of the dynamic eﬀects of conﬂict has been scratched. If politics
and institutions are important for economic growth, as much recent research suggests,
such eﬀects through our dynamic models could further our understanding of what occurs
when institutions are imperfect. However, ultimately the bigger question is how institu-
tions and governance themselves evolve to reduce conﬂict and appropriation. Hirshleifer
(1995a) suggests one factor that leads to the “breakdown” of anarchy: a conﬂict tech-
nology that is highly eﬀective so that only one side emerges victorious. What would
happen after one side is in charge, though, and presumably creates a monopolistic “state”
is another important topic.
9 Conﬂict management and the state
How can conﬂict be reduced? That is an immensely important question, of course. The
recent literature—which also reﬂects long-standing intellectual traditions in philosophy
and the social sciences—describes two ways to reduce conﬂict . In Hirshleifer’s termi-
nology, conﬂict can be reduced or eliminated through (i) vertical, Hobbesian contracts
or through (ii) horizontal, Lockean contracts. The former can be thought of as propri-
etary, for-proﬁt, hierarchical governance and the latter as contractual mechanisms that
are mostly associated with institutions of modern governance. Ultimately both types of
governance rely on the strength of the state to impose a monopoly or near-monopoly in
the means of violence, but they also reﬂect two diﬀerent types of state.
9.1 Hierarchical governance
If one party were to defeat all of its adversaries decisively, so that it eﬀectively gains
the monopoly of force, then a long-term hierarchical contract could emerge between
the winner and the losers. The winner would maintain a force that could put down
or deter signiﬁcant uprisings by the losers, the losers would not expend any resources
on arming but would have to accept whatever material compensation their position
allows while the winner would enjoy the greater material rewards the dominant coercive
position confers. The overwhelming part of recorded history has been characterized
by such hierarchical governance, with lords, kings, and emperors on top and masses of
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been stronger (or the state was stronger), the degree of conﬂict has appeared to be less
severe. However, the historical record does not reveal an overall reduction in conﬂict
associated with hierarchical governance. Rather, there seems to have been a migration
to a diﬀerent level: conﬂict with other states and internal succession struggles.
Findlay (1990) was, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst author to model the state explicitly as
a “proprietor,” to use Grossman and Noh’s (1994) characterization, with the motivation
of modelling governance in many LDCs. Grossman and Noh (1994) provided a dynamic
version of a similar model to examine the eﬀect of the endogeneity of the ruler’s survival
and therefore the inﬂuence of the eﬀective discount factor on economic policies. McGuire
and Olson (1996) went further and argued for the possible eﬀectiveness of autocracy in
stimulating investment and economic growth, by likening a ruler to a “stationary bandit”
who has an “encompassing interest” so as to limit extortionary taxation and, at the same
time, provide high levels of public goods.
However, the incentives of a strong ruler with high extractive powers are not as clear
cut as that. First, a long time horizon, necessary for the ruler to have an “encompassing
interest,” is far from being suﬃcient for the promotion of growth. As Robinson (1997)
has argued, many such policies are often at the expense of their rule: promoting trade
implies that merchants become richer and perhaps ask for more rights and a share
of power; expanding education can make more of the population become increasingly
conscious of its subservient status and therefore demand reforms and a change from
the status quo; even building roads can make it easier for rebels to reach the capital
and drive out the ruler. Stashing a few billions in Switzerland would be better for the
ruler. Second, the extractive power of the ruler can be so high that commitment to a
non-extortionary tax rate would be very diﬃcult [Moselle and Polak (2001), Konrad and
Skaperdas (2005)]. Moreover, the time horizon of rule is shortened, and its uncertainty
widened, by challenges to the ruler from within and without.
Overall, though traditional hierarchical rule could reduce conﬂict and provide other
public goods, it often recreates the problems of conﬂict at a higher and more organized
level. Indeed, tempted by the possible rents that can be extracted from their subjects,
rulers have fought incessantly with neighboring rulers throughout history. Moreover,
the problem of severely asymmetric coercive power between rulers and the ruled did
not essentially solve many of the ineﬃciencies associated with conﬂict. In many ways
it displaced the ineﬃciencies of high arming and destruction due to conﬂict with those
of lower dynamic incentives for innovation and investment that absolutist rule tends to
create. There was nobody to guard the guardians against arbitrary exactions. The type
of governance that has intermittently appeared throughout history but has gained more
ground over the past two centuries provides another model for reducing and managingEconomics of Conﬂict: An Overview 56
conﬂict.
9.2 Modern governance
The alternative mechanism to hierarchical domination for the management of conﬂict
is a contractual arrangement among equals. Note that such a contract is not like the
settlement agreements that we examined in sections 4 and 5, for those agreements are
backed up by the bargaining power conferred by arming. The contracts that we are
concerned with here entail partial or complete disarmament.58 Since, ultimately, arming
is the primary means of enforcement in settings with insecurity, such contracts pose a
serious conundrum: How can the contract be enforced when the contract itself is about
the means of its enforcement (i.e., arms)?
There is no complete or timeless solution to this conundrum, for someone somewhere
is bound to be tempted to break and will eventually break such a contract at some point in
time. Modern governance has partially solved the problem through an elaborate system
of enforcement that changes the threat points from those that involve actual ﬁghting to
others that involve going to judicial courts, to the legislatures, to bureaucratic rulings,
to the voters and so on. Separation of powers, checks and balances, the extension of
the democratic franchise, the removal of discretion in ruled-based bureaucracies, and
other mechanisms of modern states tend to create a wide dispersion of power and the
multilateral sanctions that await anybody who attempts the illegitimate use of force.
Once a modern state has consolidated its main institutions, as in the rich countries of
the West, it would be extremely diﬃcult to have, say, a military coup. Protests, strikes,
riots, other symptoms of social conﬂict still occur, of course, but organized warfare has
virtually disappeared from within the modern state. How this has come about is still
largely a mystery—or, a conundrum—but, a number of scholars have begun the immense
task of unravelling the mystery.
This research eﬀort is beyond the scope of our review, but we should mention that
conﬂict ﬁgures prominently in all examinations of the emergence of modern governance.
Long periods of conﬂict and the threat of continued conﬂict have underpinned tran-
sitions to power-sharing arrangements in as varied places and conditions as Medieval
Genoa [Greif (1998)], seventeenth-century England [North and Weingast (1989)], the ex-
tension of the democratic franchise in the West [Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)], and the
transition from apartheid rule in South Africa [Rosendorﬀ (2001)]. The role of conﬂict
in the building of the institutions that facilitated modern economic growth also ﬁgures
prominently in the survey of recent research in the area by Acemoglu et al. (2004). We
58See Esteban and S´ akovics (2006) for the derivation of a bargaining solution based on the threat of
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agree. The mystery of modern governance as well as the mystery of modern economic
growth are siblings of the conundrum of the emergence of cooperation out of conﬂict.
10 Concluding Remarks
We have provided an overview of the recent literature on appropriation and conﬂict
that takes an economic perspective. Conﬂict is a natural consequence of the basic eco-
nomic assumption of self-interest, yet it had been hardly examined from an economic
perspective up until relatively recently. By accounting for conﬂict and appropriation in
ordinary economic settings, we not only help explain issues that are related to conﬂict
per se. We can also develop a better understanding of the sources of economic growth
that concerned Haavelmo (1954) more than half a century ago as well as scholars cur-
rently working in the area of institutions and development. In closing, we would like to
emphasize some of the more surprising and yet important implications of the research
that we have reviewed:
– Conﬂict involves costs that are economically very important, ranging from the valu-
able resources diverted away from investment and consumption and instead allocated
directly to arming and the resources destroyed in conﬂict to the reduction in trade
and in the accumulation of productive capital. Estimates of the various costs by
the World Bank [Collier et. al. (2003)] and Hess (2003) are economically signiﬁcant,
especially for low-income countries; the costs of ordinary economic “distortions” pale
in comparison. It is thus surprising, if not shocking, that economists have not paid
any attention to these costs until very recently.
– The allocation of resources in the presence of conﬂict has also been shown to be, gener-
ally, very diﬀerent than when conﬂict is not present or has no costs. Compensation can
easily be inversely related to productivity; superior innovations available at zero cost
might be rejected; incentives are often skewed in favor of non-productive investment.
Thus, assuming compensation to be positively related to marginal productivity or that
all investment is productive in settings that involve conﬂict in empirical research would
be inadvisable.
– Trade in the presence of insecurity can be absent or suboptimal. Parties that face
insecurity in trade may very well choose less productive but more secure alternatives
and thus forego trade. Those that do choose to trade would have to invest in defending
their possessions, thereby leading to the common phenomenon in history of many
merchants doubling as warriors. The costs of ﬁghting over insecure resources can also
preclude trade all together.Economics of Conﬂict: An Overview 58
– A long shadow of the future need not facilitate peace. To the contrary, when ﬁghting
changes the long-term strategic positions of adversaries, a long-term horizon could
very well induce conﬂict, despite conﬂict’s short-term costs. This is a source of con-
ﬂict that has been underemphasized compared with other sources like irrationality or
asymmetric information.
– Very little is known about how to reduce, let alone eliminate, conﬂict. However, based
on recent research on institutions and economic growth as well as group formation,
we suspect that governance plays an important role. Moreover, conﬂict itself appears
to play an important role in the emergence and evolution of governance. Conﬂict,
governance, and economic growth are tied up in ways that economists and other social
scientists have only began to tentatively unravel.
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